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Abstract 
The prior paper in this sequel, Pope (2009) introduced the concept of a nominalist heuristic, defined as a focus 
on prominent numbers, indices or ratios.  In this paper the concept is used to show three things in how scientists 
and practitioners analyse and evaluate to decide (conclude).  First, in constructing theories such as purchasing 
power  and  interest  parity  to  predict  exchange  rates  and  to  advocate  floating  exchange  rates,  economists 
unwittingly employ nominalist heuristics.  Second, nominalist heuristics have influenced actual exchange rates 
through  the  centuries,  and  this  finding  is  replicated  in  the  laboratory.    Third,  nominalist  heuristics  are 
incompatible with expected utility theory which excludes the evaluation stage, and are also incompatible with 
prospect theory which assumes that, while the evaluation stage can involve systematic mistakes, the overall 
decision situation is ultra simple.  It is so simple that: a) economists and psychologists can mechanically model 
and identify what is a mistake, and b) decision makers can maximise.  However, contrary to prospect theory, in 
the typical complex situation, neither a) nor b) holds.  Assuming that a) and b) hold has resulted in the 1988 
crisis from applying the Black Scholes formulae to forward exchange rates and contributed to sequel financial 
crises including that of 2007-2009.  What is required is a fundamentally different class of models that allow for 
the progressive anticipated changes in knowledge ahead faced under risk and uncertainty, namely models under 
the umbrella of SKAT, the Stages of Knowledge Ahead Theory.  The paper’s findings support a single world 
currency rather than variable unpredictable exchange rates subjected to the vagaries of how prominent numbers, 
ratios and indices influence events via the models of scientists and practitioners. 
Key words  nominalism,  money  illusion,  heuristic,  unpredictability,  experiment,  SKAT  the  Stages  of 
Knowledge Ahead Theory, prominent numbers, prominent indices, prominent ratios, transparent 
policy,  nominal  equality,  historical  benchmarks,  complexity,  decision  costs,  evaluation, 
maximisation, Black Scholes, Lehmann Brothers, sub-prime crisis, central bank swaps. 
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1   Introduction 
This paper examines the role of prominent numbers in exchange rate determination.  It uses 
the lens of SKAT, the Stages of Knowledge Ahead Theory, Pope (1983), Pope, Leitner and 
Leopold-Wildburger  (2006,  2009),  Pope,  Selten,  Kube  and  von  Hagen  (2008).    SKAT 
delineates the four main stages through which a chooser progresses when seeking to reach 
decisions.  Each stage pertains to a change in knowledge ahead.   
In stage 1 the chooser negotiates to discover his available alternatives.  Once alternatives are 
ascertained, the chooser has a change in knowledge ahead as he now knows his alternatives.  
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He enters stage 2 of evaluating his alternatives.  Once he has finished evaluation, he has his 
second major change in knowledge ahead as he now knows his choice.  He has entered stage 
3, waiting to learn the final outcome segment of his chosen alternative.  Stage 3 ends with a 
further change in knowledge ahead.  He has entered stage 4 wherein he knows the outcome of 
his choice, so that in this respect all risks and uncertainties are resolved – certainty reigns.   
Stage 2, the evaluation of alternatives, is the focus of this paper.  Stage 2 is ignored entirely in 
EUT, axiomatised expected utility theory, which assumes that the evaluations are so trivially 
easy to do perfectly that choosers can costlessly maximise in order to  choose.  The evaluation 
stage is considered in works on money illusion such as Shaffir, Diamond and Tversky (1997), 
and  on  editing  and  framing  of  probabilities  as  in  Kahneman  and  Tversky  (1979),  and 
Brachinger (2006).  But the situations analysed are so simple that users of these theories 
believe that they can identify the optimal decision and classify as mistakes deviations from it. 
As illustrated in the fairytale in Simon (1993), real world situations are too complex for any 
scientist or member of the public to do his stage 2 evaluation by identifying one alternative as 
optimal.  When none can maximise, each uses short cut heuristics.1   
To identify how scientists and economic agents do their stage 2 evaluations in real world 
complex situations involving exchange rates requires: 
a)  establishing  a  new  theoretical  entity,  namely  the  concept  of  nominalist 
heuristics including prominent number ratios; and  
b)  abandoning standard purchasing power parity and interest parity models and 
indeed  all  maximising  models  within  the  umbrella  of  standard  rank 
dependent theories such EUT, expected utility theory, or CPT, cumulative 
prospect  theory  –  and  modelling  within  an  alternative  umbrella  theory, 
SKAT.    
The  prior  paper  in  this  sequel,  Pope,  Leitner  and  Leopold-Wildburger  (2009)  furnishes 
background on the theoretical constructs underlying a) and b).  This paper furnishes evidence 
concerning nominalist heuristics in one application, namely prominent numbers and ratios in 
determining  the  exchange  rate.    The  paper  furnishes  field  evidence  on  the  complexity 
problems encountered in evaluating alternative ways of predicting exchange rates (Part 2) and 
determining exchange rates (Part 3).  It furnishes evidence of how scientists and practitioners 
alike resort to nominalism, ie a focus on prominent numbers, indices and ratios.  Parts 4 and 5 
of this paper furnish parallel laboratory evidence on the decisive role of a prominent ratio in 
exchange  rate  determination.    Part  6  provides  an  executive  summary,  indicates  ways  of 
incorporating these nominalist effects into qualitative and quantitative investigations of the 
exchange rate process, and the paper’s policy implications. 
 
 
2   Field Evidence on Predicting the Exchange Rate 
Consider a firm who in the future must pay for an imported item in a foreign currency and 
thus  faces  an  exchange  rate  risk.    It  has  discovered  that  it  has  three  broad  classes  of 
alternatives as itemised in Table 1. 
                                                 
1   When nobody can calculate a maximum, the notion of an approximation to the maximum is arguably ill-
defined  or  empty.    Thus  there  is  no  scope  to  discern  if  any  heuristic  approximates  that  unspecifiable 
maximum – expected utility theory cannot be justified as an approximation to optimal behaviour. Pope et al Prominent Numbers in Exchange Rates: Evidence  3  5 August 2009 
Table 1 
Firm’s Choice Set   
Broad Category  Number of Distinct Alternatives in this Category 
1  stay out of the foreign exchange 
market and take what comes as 
the cost of the imports when the 
bill falls due.  
One 
2  “hedge”  against  its  own 
currency  in  case  this 
depreciates so that when the bill 
arrives it would otherwise have 
to pay more.  
Numerous, as it can offer variable amounts of its own currency on 
the foreign exchange market up to its credit limit in borrowing from 
its  domestic  currency  credit  source,  select  different  exchange  rate 
agencies to convert the funds and different ways of investing them in 
the foreign country. 
3  “speculate”  on  its  own 
currency appreciating and thus 
deciding  to  borrow  money 
abroad and bring home.   
Numerous, as it can decide to offer variable amounts of the foreign 
currency  on  the  foreign  exchange  market,  up  to  the  credit  limit 
imposed  by  its  foreign  currency  credit  source,  and  select  variable 
means of executing this and investing the speculative funds at home. 
 
Note:   For some firms, for some time periods, one of the methods of executing 2 and 3 is to buy either 
an off the shelf or else an over the  counter (OTC) forward exchange rate derivative.  OTC 
forward exchange derivatives became the norm for large firms who can afford the additional 
expense involved in having a tailor made product. OTC forward exchange derivatives are the 
only form  forward  exchange  available  for  extended periods into the future.  However  such 
tailor-made derivatives are frequently so complex that neither party understands the exchange 
rate risks involved.  See sections 2.3 and 2.6.4 below for examples resulting in bankruptcy for 
the buyer.  On account of their dangers and contribution to the dot com bubble and to the 2007-
2009 crisis, there have been calls for the abolition of all OTC derivatives, eg Tirole (2009).   
 
The choice among 1), 2) and 3) rests importantly on how likely the firm’s own country’s 
currency is to stay steady, appreciate, or depreciate.  In other words the evaluation of its 
alternatives depends importantly on the firm’s exchange rate prediction.  Predictions of the 
exchange rate influence the decisions of agents whose actions directly or indirectly influence 
the actual exchange rate.   
This part of the paper documents the difficulties faced by that firm, and by any other chooser 
whose stage 2 evaluation, directly or indirectly, may influence the exchange rate – whether 
that chooser is an academic economist, or a central banker, or a member of the Treasury or of 
a  private  firm.    The  difficulties  demonstrate  the  error  in  assuming  that  stage  2  can  be 
trivialised  or  ignored  altogether.   Before  documenting  these  difficulties  it  is  necessary  to 
dispel a misconception.   
2.1 Misunderstanding the Forward Exchange Rate Market 
Many  believe  that  mispredictions  of  exchange  rates  are  so  costless  that  firms  and 
governments should not bother to spend a moment predicting them, and as a consequence fail 
to  notice  that  such  mispredictions  cause  bankruptcies,  along  with  personal  and  economic 
distress, social upheavals and governments turfed out of office.  This is because many adhere 
to a myth, the myth that exchange rate insurance is virtually costless and ever available – by 
means of purchase of a derivative, forward exchange.  
While  quite  a  few  point  the  Black  Scholes  formula  applications  as  enhancing  insurance 
products, the myth of safe cheap exchange rate insurance actually arose amongst academic 
economists prior to the widespread usage of that formula.  The myth arose on discovering 
after the breakdown of the Bretton Woods Agreement, that exchange rates were dauntingly 
difficulty to predict, not an equilibrium breeze.  Instead of facing the facts and repudiating 
wildly  fluctuating  exchange  rates,  most  academic  economists  started  pronouncing  that Pope et al Prominent Numbers in Exchange Rates: Evidence  4  5 August 2009 
exchange rate changes hurt nobody since everybody can convert their exchange rate risk into 
certainty of no exchange rate risk at essentially zero cost.  When this assertion is carefully 
examined, it can be seen on pure logic to be impossible to be true in any general sense.   
It  is  hardly  surprising  therefore  that  empirical  checks,  eg  McKinnon  (2005),  have 
disconfirmed the claim of universal cheap exchange rate insurance.  Empirical investigations 
instead  document  the  frequent  non-availability  and  the  typical  high  costs  and  dangers  of 
hedging  via  forward  exchange  contracts.    In  1998,  false  faith  in  safe,  virtually  costless 
exchange rate insurance precipitated imminent bankruptcy of a highly exposed hedge fund, 
Long Term Capital Management, that it required swift action on the part of the Chair of the 
US Federal Reserve System to avert a 1929 style depression.  We discuss this case further in 
section 2.3, and in section 2.6 document other specific firms and governments who came to 
grief in trying to protect their firms and taxpayers with forward exchange rate derivatives and 
interest rate swaps.   
This paper is part of the serious rigorous tradition in economics that repudiates the myth of 
safe virtually costless exchange rate insurance. It acknowledges the reality that in order for 
our firm to choose sensibly amongst its options in Table 1, predicting the exchange rate is an 
important part of its stage 2 evaluation.  Before embarking on our field evidence on how 
academics,  firms  and  practitioners  go  about  predicting  exchange  rates,  it  is  necessary  to 
discuss the nature of this field evidence. 
2.2   The Role of Individual People  
Since stage 2, the evaluation of alternatives, is ignored entirely under expected utility theory 
and trivialised under prospect theory, academic economists and psychologists nurtured under 
these theories have an unduly narrow notion of field evidence on Stage 2.  These two theories 
induce  scientists  to  perceive  field  evidence  as  consisting  exclusively  of  data  to  which 
regression tests are applied.  This is because theories that ignore or trivialise the evaluation 
stage, entice scientists to assume that decisions  are so similar to each other that decision 
makers resolve every problem in the identical way as if using quantitative formulae based on 
the following assumptions. 
(i)  Maximum expected utility can be instantly and effortlessly calculated so that Stage 2 
evaluation can be skipped.   
(ii)  The influence of key individuals can be ignored.  
But assumptions (i) and (ii) are a parody of decision making concerning exchange rates in the 
real world.  The field evidence amassed in this paper is thus of an entirely different character.  
It involves looking at the details of what an individual academic or a man of affairs actually 
does when attempting to predict the exchange rate. Any academic would be outraged at the 
notion  that  his  original  unique  modelling  of  exchange  rates  has  unoriginal  mass  reaction 
characteristic (ii), as would any higher level practitioner.   
Nobel prizes for instance are awarded to scientists for exhibiting the reverse of assumption 
(ii).  Such scientists obtain Nobel prizes for being, according to their relevant academic peers, 
sufficiently  original  and  influential  as  to  change  an  aspect  of  academic  thinking.    Few 
academics declare that Nobel prizes are a mistaken concept because the individual scientist is 
irrelevant.  Pope et al Prominent Numbers in Exchange Rates: Evidence  5  5 August 2009 
Some  academics  go  even  further  and  agree  with  Keynes  who  deemed  that  individual 
academics can alter policies in firms and official sectors, and routinely do so: 
The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when 
they  are  wrong,  are  more  powerful  than  is  commonly  understood.  [Keynes  1936, 
chapter 24, concluding notes]  
Keynes himself is credited with having numerous policies implemented, including altering the 
course of exchange rate history through his role in organising the Bretton Woods exchange 
rate stabilisation system.  But in Inside the Economists Mind, Samuelson (2007) cautions on 
page x (of his three page forward covering pages viii to x) that we academics overstate our 
influence and often merely utter what those supplying funds wish to hear.  Samuelson is 
stating  a  middle  position,  not  denying  the  scope  for  individuals  to  influence  real  world 
policies and thus prices such as exchange rates.   
But  in  their  research  methodology,  many  economists  and  psychologists  deviate  from 
Samuelson’s middle ground position.  They take the extreme opposite position to Keynes, 
namely that named individuals have zero influence on the external world, ie that events in the 
external world arise exclusively from group reactions.  There are exceptions, including that 
set of economic historians who examine the impact of key individuals on exchange rate – 
despite being criticised by other economic historians for going beyond mechanical modelling.  
By far the majority of economists and psychologists however conduct their research under the 
maintained hypothesis that exchange rates (and all other studied phenomena) arise exclusively 
from  impersonal  factors  –  and  that  none  arise  from  the  idiosyncracies  of  individual 
personalities, rivalries, friendships.   
Of course few academic economists and psychologists believe that their own teaching and 
their own research is so utterly irrelevant to the real world as their research methodology 
implies.  The reigning methodology thus reveals that most academic economists have failed 
to integrate the following two beliefs. 
(a) My own individual decisions matter as reflected in own academic writings and own 
education of students who will either become academics or practitioners in the private 
or public sector and that is why I am paid and respected.   
(b)  When doing science in the form of constructing theory and collecting field evidence on 
matters such as exchange rate determination, I would be unscientific if I entertained the 
hypothesis that any individual’s decisions matter.   
The conflict between (a) and (b) hints that it is methodological bias to exclude the possibility 
of individuals mattering.  This bias is ingrained, inculcated from undergraduate days and 
more forcefully indoctrinated in graduate courses. 
To  entice  academic  economists  and  psychologists  to  become  more  open  minded  and  to 
abandon this ingrained bias, we appeal to two matters.  One is the protest lodged in a full page 
advertisement in the American Economic Review signed by Paul Samuelson, other Nobel 
laureates and eminent economists with the below text. 
We the undersigned are concerned at the threat to economic science posed by intellectual 
monopoly.  Economists today enforce a monopoly of method or core assumptions, often 
defended on no better ground than that it constitutes the ‘mainstream’.  Economists will 
advocate free competition, but will not practices it in the market place of ideas. Pope et al Prominent Numbers in Exchange Rates: Evidence  6  5 August 2009 
Consequently,  we  call  for  a  new  spirit  of  pluralism  in  economics,  involving  critical 
conversation and tolerant communication between different approaches.  Such pluralism 
should not undermine the standards of rigor; an economics that requires itself to face all 
the arguments will be a more, not a less, rigorous science. 
We believe that the new pluralism should be reflected in the character of scientific debate, 
in the range of contributions in its journals, and in the training and hiring of economists” 
[Hodgson, Maki and McCloskey (1992, pxxv) 
Our second prong in enticing economists and psychologists to quit their presumption that 
individuals are irrelevant, is to appeal to another aspect of their methodology, their emphasis 
on  testing  theories  by  their  predictions.    In  this  respect  we  outline  here  some  landmark 
exchange rate episodes.  These episodes suggest how mechanical modelling crafted within the 
reigning methodology should not be regarded as approximately true.  Rather it should be 
regarded as decisively disconfirmed since its predictions have failed catastrophically whereas 
in those episodes predictions made under the alternative methodology have been borne out.   
We  select  here  eminent  protagonists  who  have  straddled  the  academic  –  private  investor 
divide in running huge investment funds while also published widely on their conflicting 
methodologies on whether or not single individuals alter exchange rates, Merton representing 
the mechanical methodology, and Soros representing the alternative methodology wherein 
key individuals can alter exchange rate history.  This moreover is a set of landmark exchange 
rate episodes in which, after dramatic exchange rate events unambiguously disconfirmed the 
mechanical  models  methodology,  in  that:  (i)  Nobel  laureate  Merton  switched  in  2001  to 
endorse an “individuals can change exchange rate history” methodology; and (ii) there was a 
concomitant switch in membership of the Nobel prize committee and in what sort of research 
the Nobel prize committee announced that it sought to foster. 
2.3 Soros and Merton 
Soros, by at least the later 1980s, pointed to the key role of conflict and cooperation amongst 
official  sectors  in  driving  exchange  rates  after  the  breakdown  of  Bretton  Woods.   In  his 
Institute of Advanced Studies Princeton University lecture series, he averred that mechanical 
general equilibrium finance models miss the role of key individual decision makers in the 
official and private sectors, and proposed in effect that official sectors cooperate on exchange 
rate issues, Soros (1987).  But in academe mechanical modelling of exchange rates prevented 
his findings being perceived as scientific.  This was transmitted also via university training to 
some in official sectors who pressed these officials to ignore exchange rate cooperation and 
concentrate on employing mechanical models to “fight inflation first”, as documented in eg 
Pope (2008).  
In the later 1980s, within official sectors the efforts at exchange rate cooperation that had 
been fairly successful in the Plaza and Louvre accords of 1985 and 1987, became increasingly 
difficult to maintain.  Conflicts arose between on the one hand governments and Treasuries 
concerned about worsening unemployment, and central bankers on the other hand, some of 
whom  were  more  concerned  about  inflation,  and  on  the  European  front  seemingly  more 
concerned about where would be headquarters of the planned euro’s central bank.  On factors 
exacerbating conflicts, see eg Eichengreen, Wyplosz, Branson, Dornbusch and Fischer (1993) 
and Cobham (2002). 
As  1992  advanced,  Soros  predicted  in  effect  a  failure  of  cooperation  between  the  UK 
Treasury and the German central bank and a major sterling depreciation.  Major international Pope et al Prominent Numbers in Exchange Rates: Evidence  7  5 August 2009 
financiers had noticed the accuracy of Soros’ prior predictions of such failures.  Speculators’ 
imitation  of  Soros  contributed  to  Black  Wednesday  1992  when  1)  sterling  drastically 
depreciated at a massive loss to UK taxpayers and 2) the UK was forced out of the euro plans.  
In other words, Soros’ predictions involving how named key UK official sector individuals 
would  decide,  were  borne  out.    He  (and  others  who  imitated  him)  made  massive  profits 
against the Bank of England when it despaired of obtaining cooperation from Germany’s 
central bank and depreciated the pound massively on September 16, 1992, forcing it out of the 
EURO process.  The cost to Briitsh taxpayers of the depreciation (and conversely the gain to 
Soros and others), the UK Treasury put at 3.4 billion pounds.   
Nevertheless to academics creating exchange rate models and associated field data, the named 
key individuals (in the UK Treasury and in the German central bank) who generated this 
collision  course  of  extreme  cost  to  the  UK  taxpayer  and  to  world  financial  architecture, 
remained irrelevant.  Black Wednesday had to be the consequence of mechanical factors – 
market  fundamentals,  coupled  with  overshooting  and  undershooting  and  groups  of  noise 
traders creating some gyrations around equilibrium, or other perturbations creating transient 
arbitrage opportunities.  Indeed there was by the 1990s a veritable explosion of mechanically 
modelling and detecting arbitrage opportunities in exchange rates and elsewhere identifiable.   
This  explosion  was  spurred  by  developments  of  the  Black  Scholes  formula  for  pricing 
derivatives, developments that netted Merton and Scholes the 1997 Nobel prize in economics.  
Their formula enabled investors to feel safe, to feel that they had a reliable mechanical means 
of  pricing  forward  exchange  rates  and  other  derivatives  and  could  ignore  the  role  of 
individuals (like Soros and members of official sectors).  Financial institutions were by now 
hiring hoards of Finance Department graduates educated to price derivatives employing the 
Black Scholes formula, and investments in Merton and Scholes’ hedge fund, Long Term 
Capital Management exploded.  Other investment funds combined imitating Soros’ hedge 
fund with imitating Merton and Scholes’ hedge fund.   
By 1998 however, Long Term Capital Management, had so mispredicted the Russian rouble 
that it risked ushering in a 1929-style depression.  Alan Greenspan, then Chair of the Federal 
Reserve  Board of the US, is credited  with averting this disaster, Davidson (2007, 2008).  
Greenspan at the time observed that the Black Scholes formula enticed financiers to feel safer 
than was warranted.  Disturbingly numerous – perhaps even the majority of finance courses 
specialising in the mechanical methodology and Black Scholes formula applications– have 
proceeded in this millennium as if this decisive disconfirming event for the methodology did 
not occur.  Likewise prime graduate levels texts, eg Duffie (2005) and Cochrane (2007) have 
not  been  adjusted  to  even  mention  how  the  Long  Term  Capital  Management  disaster 
disproved the purported application of these theories to the real world.   
In  contrast  to  this  head-in-the  sand  approach  of  mainstream  economists,  in  Sweden,  the 
disaster was admitted to be a disaster.  It was admitted that economics should be a scientific 
discipline where the real world can disconfirm a mechanical theory and put in disrepute the 
associated mechanical methodology.  The committee that had awarded the Nobel prize for 
Black Scholes formula developments was replaced and the committee’s mandate for selecting 
winners was altered to be more inclusive of sister disciplines like psychology and to be more 
pluralistic and less mechanical in methodology.  In this latter respect, the new list of areas that Pope et al Prominent Numbers in Exchange Rates: Evidence  8  5 August 2009 
the Nobel committee proposes its award of Nobel prizes might in the future foster eclecticism 
in methodology gives the prominent position of being the final phrases to contributions that 
involve:  
less formalized confrontation of various hypotheses with empirical fact; or "simply" 
profound observation and nonformalized innovative thinking about economic issues 
[Lindbeck 1999, updated 2007]  
In short, this mechanical model failed disastrously for individuals and risked a world-wide 10 
year disaster.  The failure led one committee, sensitive to its duty to contribute productively to 
society, to downplay its former focus on mainstream mechanical economic modelling and to 
draw attention to less formalised confrontations of hypotheses with  empirical fact and to 
nonformalised innovative thinking.   
In contrast to the failures of the mechanical modelling of Merton, Soros’ less formalised 
approach allowing for the impact of individuals stood the solvency test through the East 
Asian and Russian currency crises.  Indeed Soros is possibly one of the exceedingly few key  
investors to be making profits in the 2007-2009 crisis, Soros (2008, 2009).  This enduring 
success over decades reinforces the other forms of evidence (that Soros details in his books) 
of there being no mechanical relation between the “fundamentals” of economic theorising and 
the prices of financial asset (like the exchange rate) – not even when the notion of equilibrium 
is extended to refer to decadal averages.   
Soros’ scientific understanding that key individuals matter is moreover supported by Merton 
(2001).    In  his  presentation  to  the  American  Economic  Association  Merton  offered  his 
hindsight evaluation of his errors. He saw his errors as having used an exchange rate model 
that  ignored  the  size  of  individual  investment  fund  and  the  extent  to  which  “successful” 
named investors are imitated.2  The view that namable individuals alter exchange rate history 
is also endorsed in a retrospective on the 2007-2009 by another practitioner with experience 
in  the  areas  of  central  banking,  pension  fund  and  hedge  fund  activities.    Fisher  (2009) 
observes, in effect, that field evidence constrained by equilibrium theorising mis-analyses and 
mistreats the complex financial system as if it were mechanistic in nature.  Fisher furnishes 
the vignettes for his Stage 2 thinking of each trade that he proposed to his hedge fund.  His 
vignettes do not fit the mechanical models any more than do Soros’ illuminating vignettes of 
stage  2  evaluations.    The  introduction  to  section  2.5  of  this  paper  documents  academic 
economists’ failure to predict exchange rates through their mechanical models that trivialize 
stage 2 evaluations and ignore the impact of key individuals.   
Finally  some  economists  and  psychologists  may  wish  to  discard  the  above  evidence  of 
prediction failures of mechanical models and contend that the problem is simply that the 
correct mechanical model is yet to be devised.  For such individuals no field evidence can 
alter faith.  But for such individuals laboratory evidence can.  This is because whereas in 
doing econometrics there is only one world history to examine, in the laboratory alternative 
                                                 
2   Scholes (2009), while not denying the failure of the Black Scholes formula embedded in the mechanical 
efficient market hypothesis contends that no substitute exists.  In this he is incorrect.  SKAT elucidated in 
this paper affords the umbrella theory within which more realistic modeling of how actual decisions are made 
that  set  exchange  rates  etc,  eg  along  the  lines  proposed  by  Soros.    The  substitutes  however  are 
unrecognizable as scientific models to those trained to believe models must be mechanical. Pope et al Prominent Numbers in Exchange Rates: Evidence  9  5 August 2009 
world  histories  can  be  examined  by  having  separate  sets  of  players  decide  in  identical 
settings.  Part 5 of this paper reveals that key individuals alter exchange rate history.  Nothing 
is different except the personalities of those players. 
2.4  The Role of Words in a Scientific as distinct from a Technical Contribution 
As illustrated in section 2.3, as regards exchange rate prediction, there have been dramatic 
triumphs for theories that allow for key individuals over mechanical theories, and the role of 
key individuals is corroborated in laboratory experiments.  The field evidence presented in 
this  paper  accordingly  employs  a  methodology  that  allows  for  the  individuality  of  each 
situation and the originality of each scientist and each practitioner in affecting the exchange 
rate.    This  does  not  reduce  the  paper’s  evidence  to  being  soft,  subjective,  anecdotal, 
discursive, unfocussed vignettes as suggested by one reader.   
It is an error to think that only mechanical theories enable the collection of hard, verifiable, 
objective data to enable the scientists to make generalizations that hold over extended time 
periods and across aggregates of different sorts of agents. As will be seen below, our field 
evidence enables indisputable, objective, general conclusions to be drawn over aggregates 
with  respect  to  both  individuals  and  over  time  spans.    These  generalizations  concern 
complexity: the infeasibility of optimizing; and the resort to prominent numbers, ratios and 
indices in the battery of heuristics employed in stage 2 evaluations. 
Likewise it is an error to think that scientific content rises with the ratio of equations and 
numbers  to  words.    The  contrary  is  generally  the  case  in  the  discipline  of  economics.  
Economics  concerns  how  people  decide.    To  specify  how  people  decide  in  their  stage  2 
evaluations and earlier stages in facing risk and uncertainty requires words.  To specify this 
seriously involves much analysis concentrating on the connection between symbols, numbers 
and the real world events.   
Explicating this analysis requires many words.  Empirical presentations that fail to include 
enough words to be able to articulate what their numbers mean arise from negligence in doing 
serious science.  They result in meaningless and misleading conclusions from misunderstood 
data.   
Likewise theoretical presentations that fail to include enough words to explain the denotation 
of the symbols arise from negligence in doing  serious  science, from a failure to balance 
fondness of doing algebra with concern about  what real world events the  symbols might 
denote.  This results in misleading and misunderstood conclusions on what the theory says 
about the real world.   
When the misunderstood theoretical conclusions are misconstrued as economic science about 
the real world and connected to misunderstood data, they can yield disasters such as that 
portrayed in section 2.3.  When economists continue to adhere to the belief that words are 
unscientific,  their  technical  mechanical  texts  expounding  the  Black  Scholes  and  other 
mechanical formula fail to be complemented with sentences describing what happened to the 
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They fail to increase the scientific content of their output, and fail to contribute to the safety 
and improvement of the world.  This paper seeks to help alter this shameful situation by using 
an adequate number of words to seriously relate its conceptual building blocks to real world 
events. 
Section 2.5 contains our field evidence on how academic economists make exchange rate 
predictions, and their minimal success.  This part of our field evidence takes the form of 
literature surveys on: a) academic economists’ usage of short cut heuristics in the form of 
nominalism, a focus on prominent numbers, indices and ratios in their purchasing power and 
interest parity models of the exchange rate; and b) academic economists’ extreme difficulty 
(virtually total failure in the short to medium term) in making reliable predictions.   
Section 2.6 comprises our field evidence on how men of affairs predict the exchange rate and 
their frequent mispredictions.  This component of our field evidence comprises: self-reports 
of central bankers and speculators on their inability to predict exchange rates; survey data on 
firms  systematically  mispredicting  the  exchange  rate;  and  media  reports  of  firms  into 
receivership  through  their  inability  to  predict  exchange  rates  and  governments  facing 
investigation for their loss of taxpayer funds through faulty exchange rate predictions. 
2.5  Academic Economists 
When the fixed exchange rate system of Bretton Woods was abandoned, the anticipation of 
academic  economists  favouring  floats  was  that  they  understood  the  equilibrating 
"fundamentals"  and  indeed  could  costlessly,  accurately,  instantaneously  do  their  stage  2 
evaluations to predict the exchange rate – and that there would be fewer and smaller exchange 
rate  changes  than  under  Bretton  Woods,  Friedman  (1953).    Such  is  necessary  for  good 
predictions.  Such has not transpired, Kenen (2002).  To the contrary, among themselves 
economists  have  invested  now  hundreds  of  thousands  of  hours  attempting  to  predict  the 
exchange rate.   
Ironically this expenditure of vast numbers of man hours has not enticed academic economists 
to repudiate expected utility theory, which implies that real world agents  can effortlessly 
construct models to predict the exchange rate, and instantly decide what to do.  In short 
economists  do  not  notice  the  peculiarity  of  assuming  1  when  2  and  3  are  essentially 
indisputable facts. 
1  Economists  assume  that  real  world  agents  are  brilliant  and  effortlessly,  instantly 
perform stage 2 
2  Vast hoards of academic economists labour through whole careers trying to imitate 
these brilliant real world agents in the exchange rate markets 
3  Few academic economists rate themselves as less brilliant than real world agents 
When the peculiarity of a conjunction of 1, 2 and 3 remains unnoticed, this precludes the 
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It is not merely a problem that academic economists have taken decades to try to perform 
their stage 2 exchange rate predictions while assuming that practitioners perform stage 2 
costlessly in zero time.  A second stupendous problem is the failure of these predictions.  It is 
now  nearly  40  years  since  the  Bretton  Woods  breakdown,  the  time  when  academic 
economists in sizable numbers began to attempt to understand and predict the exchange rate.  
Yet the result is essentially a total failure.  Economists now admit that their "fundamentals" 
equations have low forecasting power and perform badly out of sample, Engel, Mark and 
West (2007).  Economists take comfort in the matter that for some models for some countries 
at a 4-year horizon, out of sample they (marginally) beat the random walk, Engel, Mark and 
West (2007).  Indeed Pagan (oral discussion) argues that fundamentals only concern long 
term relationships, as when each exchange rate value and each causal factor (regressor) is an 
aggregation of events over a two to four year period.   
This view emerging in the new millennium that “fundamentals” concern the ultra long run 
places academic economists’ exchange rate predictions outside the realm of being pertinent to 
firms, households or governments.  This is because firms like households and governments 
can be bankrupted within this time span from major unpredicted exchange rate changes.  In 
Keynes’ words, in the long run “we are all dead”.  Numerous firms have been bankrupted and 
governments have been voted out from an unpredicted big exchange rate change – even if the 
predictions of these firm and governments would have been right if only people did not live in 
present but lived in some long run average mythical world.   
Yet other economists uphold academic economists’ failure to predict the exchange rate as 
evidence that enough (non-academic) agents in the market have efficiently done their stage 2 
evaluations, Engel, Mark and West (2007).  Under the efficient markets rational expectations 
hypothesis, central bankers and firms who bewail losses of taxpayers and shareholders funds 
through the inefficiency of being unable to predict exchange rates are simply unappreciative 
of their marvellously efficient system, and of the stage 2 evaluations done for them by their 
economics departments and outside consultants.  Thus the efficient markets hypothesis has 
black humour in its name.   
Let us now look into some of the specifics of three prime ways that economists do their stage 
2 evaluations in order to predict the exchange rate.  For our purposes it is not necessary, and 
would generate a paper thousand of pages long, to examine every single “new generation” 
model produced each year in the hope of overcoming the failures of past models.  It suffices 
for our purposes to document the matter with a few theories.  We select three exceedingly 
generally used theories, namely the purchasing power parity theory, the interest parity theory 
or else to avoid predicting it under the efficient markets – rational expectations theory.  Note 
that  these  three  exchange  rate  theories  need  not  be  mutually  exclusive  theories  for  an 
individual economist.  Some economists weld the three theories together.  Below our purpose 
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overall theory, in order to allow economists to proffer exchange rate predictions to an agent 
such as our firm. 
 
2.5.1 Purchasing Power Parity Heuristics 
Realistically complex models, such as ones in which land (and its accompanying resources) is 
a fixed and relatively more important input into some goods, reveal that purchasing power 
parity would not set exchange rates, not even in long run equilibrium.  Purchasing power 
parity theories however typically use the short-cut heuristic of ignoring the role of land and 
the country’s non-renewable resource base.   The standard purchasing power theories model 
exchange rates as  a function of a single inter-country overall price ratio ie focus on one 
prominent ratio.  This means that standard purchasing power theories ignore (amongst other 
things), the matter that in any country there are numerous prices and that between each pair of 
countries, key sets of prices move divergently.  To name a few, there are consumer price 
indices,  wholesale  price  indices,  nominal  wage  indices,  non-tradables  price  indices  (that 
reflect housing booms and slumps), import price indices for services, import and export price 
indices for agricultural products, import price indices for mineral fuels, lubricants and related 
materials, and so forth.  For instance in the case of Australia, exports comprise (1) mineral 
fuels, lubricants and related materials followed by (2) education. Over the June quarter 2008, 
in the September quarter 2008, prices for (1) rose 43%, while those for education remained 
almost constant.  In the cost of exports, for the capital-intensive commodities, interest rates 
are arguably the prime cost, followed by wages, and vice-versa for education exports.  In the 
six months to November 2008, interest rates as gauged by the central banks cash target, fell 
nearly 30%, while wages rose somewhat.  
Such disparate price and cost movements lie outside most academic modelling of what drives 
exchange  rates.    Take  for  instance  theoretical  and  econometric  studies  premised  on 
purchasing power parity.  In such studies, essentially arbitrarily, one price or cost index is 
prominent in the mind of the boundedly rational (ie human) economist and declared to be 
"the" price level in that country.  Then a short-cut heuristic is employed, namely to ignore the 
fact that all the other prices and costs do not move in synchronism.  Nor would they move in 
synchronism under standard theoretical assumptions – unless there existed a symmetric pair 
of  countries  with  respect  to  their  real  sectors  and  each  using  no  land  and  other  non-
renewable resources.  A like prominent index is then taken for the paired country, and the 
two are conjoined in a prominent ratio that is the essence of the purchasing power parity 
theory.  Purchasing power parity resting on the heuristic of a single prominent ratio is a 
lynchpin  in  numerous  economists'  exchange  rate  predictions  and  thus  of  their  stage  2 
evaluations.  
 
2.5.2  Interest Parity – No Arbitrage – Heuristics 
A second prime way that economists predict exchange rates and do their stage 2 evaluations is 
by means of interest parity models that connect forward and spot exchange rates to the inter-
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to  be  due  to  a  disequilibrating  "shock".    When  equilibrium  is  restored,  there  is:  a)  no 
discrepancy between the forward and the spot rate; b) the same spot rate in each period; c) no 
demand for a forward rate; d) no existence of the forward exchange rate market; and e) no 
discrepancy between interest rates in the two countries. 
In just the same way as with the purchasing power theory, this theory rests on prominent 
indices and ratios.  Depending on details concerning the particular borrowers and lenders, 
there is a plethora of interest rates in each country for any given duration.  This plethora of 
interest rates does not move in synchronism, indeed at times some interest rates move in 
reverse directions from each other as in the 2007-8 US sub-prime mortgage crisis.  In some 
countries,  central  bank  discount  rates  dropped  steeply  while  interbank  lending  rates  rose 
steeply.    Such  wildly  differing  interest  rate  movements  however  are  ignored  in  standard 
exchange rate models.  Instead, in theoretical and empirical work, one particular interest rate 
in each country with a specific duration to match that of one forward rate is selected as a 
prominent index in the form of a short-cut heuristic.  The disparate levels and movements of 
the other interest rates are ignored, as too those of forward rates of unlike periods into the 
future.  
2.5.3  So-called Rational Expectations Efficient Markets Heuristics 
Additional heuristics enter in theories whereby exchange rates are  set “efficiently” in the 
sense  of  Fama  (1965)  or  of  Lucas’  rational  expectations  (1976)  wherein  numerous  EUT 
competitive profit maximizers use all available information in an efficient manner in setting 
exchange rates. There is the short-cut heuristic of ignoring problems of ever getting to an 
equilibrium especially as it may not be unique, and of its being unstable, problems explored in 
eg  Grandmont  (1985),  De  Arcangelis  and  Gandolfo  (1997),  Chichilnisky  (1999),  Hahn 
(1999), Drèze and Herings (forthcoming), Phelps (1999), Barnett and He (1999), Sordi and 
Vercelli  (2003)  and  Dieci,  Sordi  and  Vercelli  (2006).  There  is  the  short-cut  heuristic  of 
assuming that if there are “irrational” or “noise” traders, they are insufficient in numbers to 
render the notion of an equilibrium exchange rate vacuous, but merely to cause some “over” 
and “under” shooting.  There is the short-cut heuristic of treating the equilibrium exchange 
rate  as  a  ratio  that  real  world  economic  agents  know  when  virtually  no  two  academic 
economists agree on what the ratio is since each has his own distinct theory of how the 
economy works, Phelps (1999).  There is the short-cut heuristic of treating the exchange rate 
as an equilibrium because the world is so simple that it perfectly repeats itself, Davidson 
(1984, 1988, 1991, 1993, 1996).   
There is the short-cut heuristic of treating the equilibrium exchange rate as an externally 
given ratio independent of individual human action and market power despite the contrary 
evidence discussed in section 2.5 above.  The heuristic of ignoring market power extends 
often beyond ignoring the power of major international financial firms.  The heuristic is taken 
to  the  extreme  of  ignoring  the  market  power  of  official  sectors  and  employing  efficient 
markets rational expectations models wherein all agents are powerless.  In formal modelling, 
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doing stage 2 predictions offers a game theoretic treatment of the incentives that central banks 
have to intervene to contain a financial crisis, and the role of the IMF in overcoming the 
collective action problem of joint intervention.  This is an interesting insight into the array of 
central bank swaps and gentlemen’s agreements that have emerged in September and October 
2008  in  response  to  the  sub-prime  crisis.    See  eg  the  2008  US  Federal  Reserve  Board 
announcements in this regard and note that via renewals, most of these swap agreements 
remain in force at the time of completing this paper draft, July 2009. The Hausken-Plümper 
model is also an interesting insight into the proposals of Bergsten (beginning in the 1970s) 
joined  since  2008  by  China  and  Russia  and  to  a  degree  by  India,  for  the  IMF’s  special 
drawing rights to be modified partially or wholly towards a single world currency.  See eg 
Bergsten (2009). 
Economists’  heuristic  of  ignoring  the  market  power  of  official  national  and  international 
organisations and of big private funds cannot be explained by economists not having caught 
up with the legal power of modern official sectors to print their own currency, and the size of 
some  modern  private  funds.    Market  power  in  exchange  rate  markets  is  not  a  new 
phenomenon.  The market power of official sectors and of major international financiers were 
crucial also to exchange rates in the prior century plus of the bimetallic and gold standard 
eras.  The maintenance of those systems and currency unions within them rested on central 
bank cooperation, sometimes enforced by threats.  This can be seen from the work of a set of 
economic  historians  who  document  how  central  bankers  and  major  private  international 
financiers such JP Morgan and Rothschild operated.  These economic historians document 
how such agents performed their stage 2 evaluations of what was needed to maintain these 
systems and predict when there would be insufficient official sector cooperation and thus an 
exchange rate change.  See Hooks (2005), Butkiewicz (2005, 2008) and Flandreau (2003a, 
2003b, 2006).   
2.5.4   Overview of Academic Economists’ Exchange Rate Predictions Heuristics 
In performing stage 2 evaluations, with few exceptions, economists have found it too difficult 
to  incorporate  into  their  models  predicting  exchange  rates  key  issues  like  market  power.  
Market power, as documented by the economic historians quoted in section 2.5.3, involves 
the complicated matters of cooperation and conflicts of public officials with each other and 
with  key  international  financiers.    Models  incorporating  all  these  evolving  and  dynamic 
personality and power structure issues would face tractability issues.  Instead, for performing 
stage 2 and predicting exchange rates, academic economists employ algebraic models that fail 
empirically and that are rife with nominalism, a focus on prominent indices and ratios as 
short-cut heuristics for complex reality.   
The economics profession has jointly invested over 35 years, and the entire academic careers 
of innumerable economists in this to date failed exchange rate prediction endeavour.  This has 
not  caused  most  academic  economists,  however,  to  conclude  that  performing  stage  2  is 
difficult for themselves or for practitioners, and to realise that it is so difficult that they resort 
to nominalist heuristics.  It is difficult for a scientist to discern that a stage is difficult if that 
scientist’s  theory  excludes  or  trivialises  that  stage.    The  upshot  is  that  most  academic Pope et al Prominent Numbers in Exchange Rates: Evidence  15  5 August 2009 
economists continue to model exchange rate determination assuming that the non-academic 
sector  have  such  an  easy  time  doing  their  stage  2  evaluations  that  for  practitioners  their 
investment  in  stage  2  evaluations  can  be  ignored  (expected  utility  theory)  or  trivialised 
(prospect theory) and maximising procedures can be assumed. 
2.6 Men of Affairs 
Let  us  now  consider  whether  predicting  exchange  rates  and  doing  stage  2  of  evaluating 
alternatives has proven easier for practitioners and whether in fact they use the maximising 
procedures  assumed  typically  by  academic  economists.    Here  our  field  evidence  of  their 
massive difficulties has two strands, 1) accounts of private and public sector officials of how 
they evaluated and accounts of the mistakes that they made; and 2) public reports (ie other 
people's verdicts) of mistakes made by business economists, by public officials who lose 
taxpayers  funds  and  by  companies  put  into  liquidation  or  receivership  because  of  their 
mistakes in predicting exchange rates. 
 
2.6.1  Bayesian Priors 
One set of business economists use a  stage 2 evaluation technique that warrants separate 
mention,  Putnam  and  Quintana  (1994).   This  technique  employs  new  Bayesian  statistical 
approaches  for  combining  seven  exchange  rate  predictions  and  investment  strategies.    A 
comparison is not made with the random walk, but with returns on investing in the S&P 500 
for a particular period.  It is contended that the exchange rate dependent investments exceeded 
returns on investing in the S&P 500 by a factor of 6 or 7 to 1, when employed out of sample.  
This is impressive, even if a technique that for one sample period resoundingly beat the S&P 
500 is not information that a firm or official sector can readily use to assess confidence in the 
point estimate of the single exchange rate on which its decision rests in the first instance.   
Necessarily the Bayesian priors technique stage 2 evaluation successes are reported ex post, 
and the paper does not provide us the readers with the scope to verify that they are precisely 
the ex ante predictions and a reader could himself compute from ex ante specified equations.  
The techniques are reported however as very similar to those of Zellner (1971).  On the other 
hand, the era of prediction, the end of 1987 to the end of 1993, does encompass the exchange 
rate crisis of the UK (one of the currencies in their package).  Still our firm could have more 
confidence  in  the  technique  if  there  were  successor  publications  reporting  that  a  like 
impressive  result  was  obtained  via  the  technique  over  sequential  periods  to  date.  
Conversations with Arnold Zellner indicate that this might indeed be the case.  Our firm can 
thus put Bayesian priors techniques in the possibilities category. 
 
2.6.2  Chartists or Technical Analysts 
To help firms do their stage 2 evaluations, a growing proportion of exchange rate dealer firms 
ignore  fundamentals  and  sell  predictions  based  instead  on  what  has  come  to  be  termed 
chartism or technical analysis.  Indeed the proportion using technical analysis is imputed to 
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as the Sharpe and Treynor ratios and Jensen’s alphas.  Technical analysis seeks to identify 
upper and lower barriers beyond which it is unlikely that an exchange rate will move, barriers 
at which it is predicted that there will be exchange rate turbulence, reversals of trends.  The 
predictions can involve judgment in discerning the patterns, in which case it is sometimes 
termed chartism, or the predictions can be mechanical, the product of fixed statistical rules. A 
US survey found that by 1996-7, usage of prominent number barriers and other forms of 
technical analysis had risen to be the main exchange rate prediction tool of 30% of exchange 
rate operators, Cheung and Chinn (2001).  A British survey found that for predictions of 
under a week, technical analysis predominates, Taylor and Allen (1992).  By 2005, a former 
Bank of England and hedge fund (Global Macro) employee reported that the opinion in the 
City  of  London  was  that  80%  of  exchange  operators  employ  prominent  numbers  from 
technical analysis to make money, Fisher (2009).  He has further elucidated, that technical 
analysis also influences the trades of some fundamentalist traders since some of these know 
that charts can influence prices, and gives the following example.   
So  if  I’m  an  investment  manager  wanting  to  go  long  Japanese  equities  (for 
fundamental reasons), I will implement my position carefully, with charts in mind 
(e.g. if the market looks like it might go down for chartist reasons, I may hold off 
buying equities until it does). [Fisher private email to author 30 July 2009] 
Short-range  predictions  based  on  some  variants  of  chartism  (technical  analysis)  have 
attractive  statistical  properties,  eg  Neely  (1997),  Osler  (2000,  2003).    But,  as  with  the 
economists’ models based on fundamentals, any technical analysis model faces the hurdle of 
being demonstrated to be robust out of sample.3   Some technical analysis models on average 
marginally beat the random walk for out of sample horizons of a few hours to 15 days ahead, 
arguably as Fisher 2009) opines, through a self-fulfilling prophecy element when so many 
traders use related technical analysis models.  
But for economic efficiency, the hurdle is higher than barely beating the random walk over a 
horizon of less than a week ahead.  If they are to efficiently plan, and avoid massive losses, 
the public sector and firms engaged in real and financial imports and exports require models 
with far longer horizons and a far higher level of predictability.  
 
2.6.3  Forward Premia 
It might be thought that firms can predict the exchange rate from the forward market, as the 
efficient market rational expectations hypothesis would propose.  This however is decidedly 
risky, above all when exchange rate changes are big.  Just how disastrously risky is reliance 
on forward premia to predict the exchange rate, consider the years 1981 to 1984.  In every 
single quarter over these four years, the expected depreciation of the US dollar against the 
average of the pound, the D-Mark, the Swiss franc and the yen for each of six major exchange 
rate expectation indices, exceeded 4% and for some exceeded 8%.  Yet in reality in each of 
these years the US dollar appreciated, doubling in value for instance against the D-Mark 
                                                 
3 Even  as  regards  past  data,  there  have  been  few  efforts  to  compare  the  success  of  technical  analysis  and 
fundamental approaches in exchange rate predictions – there seems to be too few scientists with a mutual 
respect of both approaches to invest the effort in making such a statistical comparison. Pope et al Prominent Numbers in Exchange Rates: Evidence  17  5 August 2009 
between 1982 and 1985.  For further details on this five year era of systematic enduring 
erroneous exchange rate expectations as measured by the forward rates, see eg Frankel and 
Froot (1987).   
To see how disastrously risky it continues to be to rely on forward premia to predict the 
exchange rate, consider the sub-prime crisis of 2007-2009.  It involved a totally unanticipated 
episode  of  a  sharply  increasing  US  dollar,  contrary  to  all  arbitrage-based  exchange  rate 
models.  Eventually many realised its origin in the inability of agents to maintain or roll over 
their dollar obligations as desired, Soros (2008). This inability resulted in mass sell-offs of 
other currencies involved in carry trades to meet the US dollar denominated obligations.  This 
inability was unpredicted since it involved liquidity constraints.  Liquidity constraints are 
ignored in equilibrium exchange rate theories, including those that allow periods of over and 
under shooting of equilibrium.  Attention to liquidity constraints is limited to non-mainstream 
analysts such as Davidson (2007, 2008) and Telser (2007a, 2007b). 
The exchange rate disaster that otherwise would have ensued was mitigated by central bank 
swaps  orchestrated  to  overcome  the  dollar  shortage  among  major  currency  blocs,  then 
extended to many other currencies.  The September 2008 swap between the European Central 
Bank and the US Federal Reserve Board for instance coincided with an ending of the fall of 
the euro’s value from being worth 1.7 US dollars in April, to being worth only little more than 
1.25 US dollars by the beginning of September.  With some wobbles, this swap facility to 
overcome the dollar shortage created by non-rolloverable debts, has allowed the euro by July 
2009 to climb more than half way back to its April 2008 level, back up to being worth over 
1.4 US dollars.   
2.6.4  Firm Failures 
Firms also have access to confidential exchange rate models to predict exchange rates and to 
do  their  stage  2  evaluations.    These  are  not  readily  amenable  to  robustness  checks  by 
academics, so we judge them by our incomplete media information about the exchange rate 
profits and losses of those using these confidential sources.  This information hints at firms 
lacking access to reliable exchange rate predictions, even when they are giant multinationals.   
Firm losses on their foreign exchange accounts  come often from efforts to hedge against 
exchange rate changes.  Hedging for an extended period ahead is expensive, complex and not 
available to small firms. The terms are mostly confidential, so that it must be hard for the 
firm’s agents to even discern what is the relevant future’s price for one’s particular firm 
looking  at  its  range  of  future  dates  that  matter,  even  if  it  accepted  the  efficient  market 
hypothesis.  Further, all government inquiries of which the authors are aware, report market 
power in exchange rate spot and forward deals.  Small firms seek to avoid being caught in one 
of  these  bubbles,  and  larger  ones  seek  to  avoid  causing  one  of  them.    This  adds  to  the 
complexity of their evaluations of each hedging and speculation alternative.   
The media reports firm errors in their hedging and speculation moves.  Around the beginning 
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hedge its Australian operations.  It sought to hedge against the anticipated appreciation of the 
Australian dollar against that of the US – zinc being sold in the international market at US 
prices.  It purchased an exotic derivative for this purpose.  It however failed to consider quite 
how unpredictable exchange rates are.  Instead of appreciating at that time, the Australian 
dollar sank rapidly and drastically against the US dollar.  The conditions of the purchased 
exotic  were  such  that  the  company’s  liabilities  rapidly  exceeded  its  assets,  forcing 
reconstruction.  This is not an isolated case.  Consider Long Term Capital Management’s mis-
prediction of the rouble-USD exchange rate.4   
 
2.5.5  Official Sector Failures 
The official sector of a country has other confidential means of predicting exchange rate 
changes not available to the private sector.  But their methods do not yield them reliable 
predictions of the exchange rate either, as many of them admit.  Their econometric models 
yield  predictions  deemed  inferior  to  asking  the wise  their  hunch,  Pagan  (2005).    Central 
bankers bewail the inability of their research departments to furnish satisfactory exchange rate 
predictions, eg Jarle Bergo (2006), and Deputy Governor of the Norwegian central bank, 
Edward George (1998) then Governor of the Bank of England.  This has been an enduring 
problem for the Bank of England of being startled by sterling’s exchange rate changes and 
never,  not  even  retrospectively,  succeeding  in  understanding  them.    See  for  instance  the 
illuminating summaries of its Monetary Policy Committee minutes and other public sources 
concerning  the  mystification  of  the  Bank  of  England  on  why  sterling  so  dramatically 
appreciated  between  1996-8,  then  dipped,  and  why  it  had  another  dip  in  2003,  Cobham 
(2006).    Paul  Volcker,  former  Chair  of  the  US  Federal  Reserve  System,  finds  the 
unpredictability a ground for abandoning floats.5   
Government treasuries (who via interest rate swap deals and so forth, acquire international 
currency / short term debt) suffer the same lack of access to reliable theories with reliable 
predictions on future exchange rates.  Thus at about the same time that Pasminco went into 
reconstruction,  the  Australian  treasury  incurred  losses  on  its  international  portfolio  at  the 
beginning  of  this millennium,  losses  borne  by  the  general  taxpayer.   The losses  were  so 
massive that the country’s central bank deterred a parliamentary proposal to have the interest 
rate swaps liquidated on the grounds that the sums involved would likely cause a further 
massive depreciation of the Australian dollar. 
Official  sector  declarations  in  big  countries  have  arguably  unintentionally  wrecked  the 
economies  in  a  number  of  smaller  countries  in  2008.  In  September  Treasury  Secretary 
Paulson  allowed  Lehmann  Brothers  to  fail,  unleashing  a  financial  disaster.    In  response 
official sectors in the major European countries and in the US rescued on an ad hoc basis any 
major financial institution about to collapse and then in October made declarations that such 
                                                 
4 Beware of the hindsight bias in which everyone sees that Pasminco was a fool in the exotic derivative it used 
in its attempt to hedge.  In this context, one needs to bear in mind that Enron did not collapse solely through 
fraud.  It collapsed partly also through the complexity and uncertainty of exotic derivatives being quite beyond 
the evaluation capacity of Enron employees (and most others).  
5 On a panel discussing exchange rates at the American Economic Association meetings in New Orleans, 2001, 
he constantly challenged his academic co-panelists, all enthusiastic floaters, to explain what was so good about 
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rescues  would  be  continued  in  order  to  safeguard  the  financial  system.  But  many  other 
countries  such  as  Iceland  and  Hungary  were  unable  to  offer  such  official  sector  rescue 
guarantees, and thus the set of declarations was followed quickly by exchange rate collapses, 
Soros (2008, pp162-163).  The September and  October central bank  currency swaps that 
excluded some countries may have had a like unintended detrimental effect on the exchange 
rates of some not receiving the swap opportunity.  In some cases later central bank currency 
swaps avoided further damage from these unintended detrimental exchange rate effects.  For 
instance  the  European  Central  Bank’s  November  2008  swap  agreement  with  Hungary’s 
central bank seemed to have stopped the Hungarian Florint’s fall, Darvas and Pisani-Ferry, 
2008.  Again, the European Central Bank’s December 2008 swap agreement with Poland’s 
central bank seemed to have stopped the Zloty’s fall, Wagstyl (2008) cited in Hunter and 
Ryan (2009).  
2.5.6   Overview of Practitioners’ Exchange Rate Predictions Heuristics 
In summary, it is non-trivial for practitioners to predict exchange rates including how their 
own  actions  alter  exchange  rates.    But  organisations  like  central  banks  and  large 
multinationals have little in the way of cash constraints on buying predictions from the top 
international academics and other sources.  Yet even these entities have public records of 
making grave errors for their own stake-holders and for innocent third parties.  Practitioners 
use  economists’  models  that,  as  demonstrated  in  section  2.5,  are  rife  with  nominalist 
heuristics, that is a focus on prominent numbers, ratios and indices.  Additionally the private 
sector has come to rely increasingly on technical analysis which makes a very different use of 
prominent numbers, ratios and indices, and has, compared to academic economists’ models, a 
whiff, but only a whiff, of out-of-sample prediction success in the ultra short run.  
 
3 Field Evidence of Nominalism in Exchange Rate Determinations 
Part 2 presented field evidence of nominalism, a focus on prominent numbers, ratios and 
indices,  being  rife  in  how  scientists  and  practitioners  predict  exchange  rates.    This  part 
presents field evidence of nominalism, a focus on prominent numbers, ratios and indices, 
determining exchange rates. 
 
 
3.1 Exchange Rate Contracts 
Nominalism enters exchange rate determination through the tendency to write international 
debt contracts in nominal exchange rate terms.  Such nominalism fails to take into account the 
country locations of those engaging in the contract, the set of countries in which the lent funds 
will be spent, and the set of countries in which the borrower will subsequently spend the 
contingently repaid loan.  It ignores the divergently moving pertinent price levels and third 
party  exchange  rates  that  should  influence  the  exchange  rate  contract  terms.    Academic 
economists’ modelling nearly always is only one step less nominalist – it tends to consider 
only the subsequent exchange rate adjusted as if the pair of countries each had only one price 
for all inputs and outputs, and as if third party country prices were irrelevant. Pope et al Prominent Numbers in Exchange Rates: Evidence  20  5 August 2009 
3.2  Inertia 
Pope (1981, 1985a, 1987) found evidence that import competing firms made their decisions 
on the basis of current relative prices, including on the current exchange rate.  They did not 
employ less nominalist procedures of looking at the bigger range of numbers required to 
make decisions on past trends or prior fluctuations in either the exchange rate or in other 
pertinent relative prices. 
3.3  Mythical Benchmarking 
Money is fiduciary, as too are exchange rates.  What generates trust in a currency pertains to 
beliefs  in  a  maintained  order,  in  what  are  the  fixed  connections  between  numbers.    As 
understanding  of  the  world  changes,  previously conceived  connections  get  condemned  as 
mythical, as laughably nominalist.   
Often  opinion  is  mixed  on  what  is  mythical,  what  is  real.    Thus  in  this  millennium 
international investors hire chartists, and partially base their decisions on their advice, and 
chartist  theories  employ  prominent  numbers  and  ratios  and  other  connections  between 
numbers.  Many economists and others laugh at usage of such techniques, and deem that 
whiles prominent numbers and ratios may have some impact on exchange rates, the overall 
impact must be modest and transitory.   
But when understandings are reasonably widespread, their impact on exchange rates can be 
decisive and endure over centuries or over thousands of years.  We give but one example for 
countries bordering the eastern Mediterranean.  Two widely used currencies in this part of 
antiquity  were  gold  and  silver  for  which  an  exchange  rate  of  gold  to  silver  remained  at 
roughly 13:1 for centuries.  This exchange rate of roughly 13:1 is dated by some as far back 
as the Croessus, but more reliably to the later Croesids with a Persian bimetallic fixed rate of 
13.33:1,  le  Rider  (2001).  This  prominent  ratio  of  13:1  has  been  the  most  enduring  and 
decisive  exchange  rate  determinant  in  the  world,  present  already  in  ancient  Persia,  and 
continuing into the later middle ages in key trading centres of the Eastern Mediterranean such 
as Venice, eg Spufford (1986, Table II and, 1988, Table 7). Indeed on some interpretations of 
the evidence, when the band about 13:1 is 9:1 to 16:1, the exchange rate of silver for gold of 
13:1 has been maintained over a very extensive geographic area for 5,000 years eg Myers 
(1976), Mayr (2004).   
This exchange rate of gold to silver of roughly 13:1 pertained to what today we might see as 
the mythical association of gold with the sun and the silver with the moon plus a belief in 
harmonies between celestial and earthly relationships.  The sun takes one year for a cycle 
through the ecliptic where the moon completes 13 such cycles in this time.  This exchange 
rate was maintained via the incentives for the production of gold and silver.  In the absence of 
wars and other major upheavals, this ratio could be maintained for extended periods given the 
fiduciary role of any currency.  That is, given that many trusted in the ratio of 13:1 being the 
natural harmony – the equilibrium.  Pope et al Prominent Numbers in Exchange Rates: Evidence  21  5 August 2009 
The prominent ratio of 13:1 did not entirely disappear from gold-silver exchange rates with 
the Renaissance bringing modern astronomy and new world discoveries vastly augmenting 
gold and silver supplies.  An internet search demonstrates continued use of the gold silver 
ratio in the vicinity of 13:1 to advise clients.  Eg Stanczyk (2009).  What has altered is the 
reasoning  for  faith  in  this  prominent  13:1  ratio.    The  reasoning  has  shifted  from  moon 
rotations about the sun to geologist’s estimates of the earth’s quantity of gold and silver, 
Sanders  (2003).    Of  course  geologists’  estimates  of  minable  gold  and  silver  in  the  earth 
depend on faith that the prevailing price ratio of gold to silver will be pertinent when the ores 
are mined.  That is, even today, a prominent ratio that has endured for thousands of years still 
has some role in the actual gold to silver exchange rate, even if a less decisive role than in 
antiquity of the middle east. 
3.4 Historical Benchmarking 
Prominent numbers have been interpreted as determining whether an exchange rate between a 
national currency and gold would be politically feasible, enforceable, stable, or with a likely 
trend path.  Thus a stumbling bloc to the early resumption of the gold standard after World 
War 1 – given the costs of the war to Britain and her consequent indebtedness to the US – was 
the following.  Britain had suspended conversions of the pound into gold during the war.  She 
wished  to  return  to  the  gold  standard  soon  afterwards,  but  found  that  the  historically 
prominent number ratio, the pre-war ratio of the pound to gold was too high a ratio at which 
to return.  The other key countries’ central bankers, however, considered that a resumed gold 
standard with the pound at any other exchange rate to gold could not be credible.  They thus 
virtually forced the delay in when Britain “went back on gold” until 1925, and forced her 
going  back  at  that  historically  prominent  number  ratio.    In  turn,  since  that  historical 
benchmark  was  inappropriately  high,  Keynes  campaigned  for  Britain  to  go  off  the  gold 
standard.  Britain’s departure from the gold standard ensued within a few years.  Thus one can 
interpret that particular historically prominent number as causing  a delay in the effective 
resumption of the gold standard, of causing the British pound exchange rate of the mid 1920s, 
and causing Britain’s depreciation of her currency a few years later. See eg Keynes (1989), 
Howson (1975), Earley (1976), Pope D and Pope R (1980), and Butkiewicz (2005, 2008).  
Again, after the demise of Bretton Woods, several countries retained a historical exchange 
rate from prior to the demise, or from some subsequent important date.  Let us give two 
examples where the motivation of the unilaterally linking country, so far as we can glean 
from public information, has related to avoiding appreciations in order to promote exports.  
Austria maintained seven Austrian shillings to the DM essentially until the introduction of the 
euro.    Until  pressured  early  in  this  millennium  to  allow  some  renminbi  appreciation, 
industrialising China had settled on maintaining a historical benchmark of the Yuan to the 
USD.  
In other instances, historical benchmarking stems neither from the credibility issues as in the 
case of Britain’s return to the gold standard in 1925, nor from helping trade flows.  Rather it 
stems  from  a  country’s  citizenry’s  national  pride  and  concerns  about  terms  of  exchange Pope et al Prominent Numbers in Exchange Rates: Evidence  22  5 August 2009 
altering the distribution of wealth (and cost of imports). The most recent instance of this was 
East Germany.  The exchange rate on unification with the west was set on a nominal equality 
basis, at 1:1 for prices, wages and savings below a particular level, depending on one’s status.  
Nothing else was deemed politically feasible, even if some argued this high value for the East 
German currency relative to that of West Germany would hinder East Germany’s economic 
catch-up.  Savings above the designated limit moreover faced an exchange rate of 2:1 (two 
Marks to one DM), so here we have one more example of a prominent number ratio in the 




3.5  Prominence in the Numbers Themselves 
3.5.1  In Administered Exchange Rates 
Prominent numbers often determine the exchange rate of a new currency introduced.  Thus 
when the DM was introduced it was set at the round number of 4 DM to a USD.  When it was 
decided that this was too high a value for the DM, the devaluation was another prominent 
number, a 5% devaluation.  Likewise prominent numbers, not percentages with numerous 
decimal points, determined the size of other exchange rate changes during the Bretton Woods 
era.  Prominent numbers continue to determine changes in pegs for those countries continuing 
on pegs or returning to pegs today.  A prominent ratio was chosen for the introduction of the 
EURO to world financial markets on 1
st January 1999. 
 
3.5.2  In Speculation 
Consider the technical analyst's prediction tools of a lower bound “support” through which a 
falling exchange rate is unlikely to lastingly pierce, instead on hitting this, likely to reverse, 
and of an upper bound “barrier” that an exchange rate is unlikely to lastingly surpass, instead 
on hitting it, likely to reverse.  These lower and upper bounds tend to be prominent numbers.  
In speculative exchange rate dramas, “breaking the barrier” of round numbers makes headline 
news.    Much  interest  was  expressed  for  instance  when  the  Euro  initially  slid  below  its 
introductory ratio 1:1 with the US dollar, and when it later rose above that nominal equality of 
1:1 after 15
th July 2002.  
De Grauwe and Decupere (1992) concluded that attention to the prominent numbers of these 
“barriers” affected the actual USD yen ratio.  Likewise a study of six technical analysis firms 
over  1996-8,  Osler  (2000,  2003)  found  that  exchange  rate  dealers’  attractions  to  the 
prominence of round numbers for these chartist “supports” / “barriers” may be the cause of 
the clustering observed in currency stop-loss and take-profit orders.  See also Westerhoff and 
Reitz (2003) on the impact of “barriers” and “supports” on actual exchange rates  
Such findings, however, like the media reports that abound in prominent numbers, pertain 
primarily to the ultra short run, durations of up to 15 days, with the focus on shorter durations 
of up to five days – not to any longer term enduring impact of the exchange rate over the 
period of concern to those involved in importing and exporting goods and services or longer 
term capital flows.  There is a prevailing view that prominent numbers could not matter over 
these longer range horizons of a year plus, that over these longer horizons, the exchange rate 
would rest solely on fundamentals.  Pope et al Prominent Numbers in Exchange Rates: Evidence  23  5 August 2009 
3.5.3  In Central Bank Rates 
Official interest rates influence the exchange rate.  In settings these, proportionate prominent 
numbers are the norm.  This can be seen for instance in citations from FOMC archival notes 
of the US Federal Reserve, Goodfriend and King (2005).  It can also be seen in the citations 
from the MPC minutes of the Bank of England, Cobham (2006).  Market determined interest 
rates reported from these meetings are non-prominent numbers.  But officially set interests 
rates are proportionate prominent numbers.  The officially set rates rose or fell typically by 
0.5% if a big change was selected, or by 0. 25% if a small change was selected.   
3.6 Nominalism a Missing Link? 
Does nominalism have overall systematic effects on floating exchange rates – in particular 
effects sufficiently enduring to matter for those involved in importing and exporting goods 
and services, and in capital movements concerned with returns over this intermediate time 
horizon?    We  might  seek  to  infer  this  from  the  exchange  rate  prediction  success  of 
economists’ public access theories of exchange rate determination.  These theories ignore 
stage 2 of the decision process, and thus the role of nominalism.  So if they predict well with 
robust statistical properties, it would seem that prominent numbers and nominalism only enter 
exchange  rate  determination  episodically.    As  described  in  Part  3  above,  we  lack  out  of 
sample  evidence  that  even  the  latest  generation  theories  predict  well.    There  is  thus  a 
possibility  that  the  unreliability  stems  partly  from  omission,  or  inappropriate  methods  of 
inclusion, of the phenomenon of prominent numbers and nominalism effects.   
However a leap to the conclusion that the unpredictability of exchange rates directly relates to 
their omission of nominalism is to ignore other issues that might explain the unpredictability.  
First these theories also omit stages 1 and 3 of the decision process.  Second these theories are 
estimated as if exchange rate regimes and numerous other influences were stable for sizable 
periods, when in fact these influences were changing frequently.  Third it could be that there 
is  nothing  systematic  to  be  discerned  in  exchange  rate  movements,  as  argued  under  the 
efficient markets hypothesis. 
 
 
4  Laboratory Experiment  
A laboratory experiment allows for the evolving stages of knowledge ahead.  Where there is 
sufficient  time  in  a  single  experiment,  it  can  allow  for  all  stages,  including  stage  1  of 
discovering via research and negotiation, the choice set of each agent with a specific role, eg 
as  the  government,  the  central  bank,  a  firm,  a  wage  bargainer.    Where  experimental 
participants cannot be kept for this long, our case, the laboratory set-up fixes the choice set of 
participants in each role, ie the experimental set-up cannot investigate stage 1.  But it can 
investigate the risk and uncertainty effects of the later stages 2, 3 and 4. 
A laboratory experiment allows us to hold the exchange rate regime and other influences 
constant so that the estimates are not bedevilled by violations of the “other things constant” 
assumption in seeing whether the resultant exchange rate is white noise, as under the efficient 
market  hypothesis.    It  thus  lends  insight  on  whether  and  how  prominent  numbers  and 
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manner than the specific ways identified in Part 4 – and enter it over the medium term time 
horizon involved for international trade in goods and services and the associated medium term 
horizon capital flows. 
Our design seeks to capture corporatist union-influenced continental Europe.  Output prices 
are determined in a domestic Cournot market with five firms in each country, while imported 
materials  prices  are  competitively  determined,  and  wages  set  via  centralized  bargaining 
between an employer and an employee representative.  We examine the effects of a dirty float 
in which central banks automatically intervene to support their exchange rate targets, and we 
vary the degree of transparency.   
We  make  the  context  concrete  to  all  participants,  given  the  evidence  that  context  affects 
decisions.  The world is complex so that conclusions drawn from simplified set-ups may miss 
effects, and this matter is especially important when the study concerns complexities that 
generate  the  phenomenon  of  prominent  numbers  and  nominalism.    Our  design  is  a 
compromise between the complexity of reality, and other constraints, including the number of 
seats in our laboratory, and the maximum time for which we keep participants in a session 
(one day).  It is perhaps the most complex experiment performed in an economics laboratory 
other  than  those  on  the  Sinto  market,  Becker  and  Selten  (1970),  Becker  Feit,  Hofer  and 
Leopold-Wildburger (2006).  More complex experiments have been conducted in psychology 
laboratories on economic decision-making, eg Dörner, Kreuzig, Reither and Stäudel (1983) 
and MacKinnon and Wearing (1983).   
We restricted the complexity to what was teachable to advanced economics students for them 
to play it within a day, and analyzable with a game theoretic benchmark of an incomplete 
equilibrium.  This incomplete equilibrium involves the non-co-operative Cournot solution for 
final output, and a Nash bargaining equilibrium in the nominal wage rate solution.  This 
equilibrium in an incomplete mode was constructed for the design by Reinhard Selten.  The 
incomplete equilibrium does not specify choices at all information sets and allows a player to 
neglect those branches of the game which, on being reached by his actions could not improve 
his payoff, no matter what is assumed about unspecified choices.   
The  set-up  retains  key  features  of  economists'  prominent  ratio  and  numbers  theories  of 
exchange  rate  determination,  including  that  in  equilibrium  purchasing  power  parity  and 
interest rate parity both hold.  It permits, but does not impose, game theoretically rational 
optimising behaviour.  Under such behaviour, in its symmetric equilibrium that, as singled out 
by plausible selection criteria, is unique in real terms, purchasing power parity and interest 
rate parity both hold.  There are two countries (the limit of our laboratory space of 18 seats, 9 
for each country), each with its own currency, symmetric in every respect.  In each country 
there is: 1 government, 1 central bank, 1 union representative, 1 employer representative, 5 
firms who buy local and imported materials produced under competitive conditions that are 
used in fixed proportions to produce a homogenous final good sold in a Cournot market, with 
nominal demand set by the government.  Firms buy their imports on credit, and must pay for 
them only next period.  They face fixed costs, must produce at least a minimum amount, and 
face  a  capacity  constraint  on  the  maximum  that  they  can  produce.    They  can  hedge  or 
speculate in the current period, prior to its exchange rate being determined, and thus face 
uncertainty concerning both the current and the future exchange rate.  Firm importing and Pope et al Prominent Numbers in Exchange Rates: Evidence  25  5 August 2009 
hedging / speculative activity helps determine the exchange rate whenever the two central 
banks conflict on their exchange rate goals.   
4.1  Central Bank Intervention 
If the two central banks have the identical aim for the exchange rate, and fully support their 
aim, they determine it.  It is only in the case of conflicts between central banks –less than co-
operation among central banks – that firms have an influence on the resultant exchange rate.  
This is the case even though there are third party exchange rates.  To be a fully cooperating 
pair of central banks in maintaining their shared exchange rate aim means that the pair are 
willing, if need be, to sacrifice other goals such as their exchange rate desires as regards other 
currencies, or as regards the state of their own country’s business cycle.   
An example of inadequate central bank cooperation was when the UK suffered a speculative 
attack in 1992.  The UK Treasury refused to raise its interest rate to stave off the attack when 
British firms were in a severe recession, but did not wish to depreciate and so be forced out of 
the process leading to being a member of the planned euro.  It sought help to avoid such a 
depreciation through the German central bank intervening on the UK pound’s behalf – but the 
reciprocal intervention did not come.  
An example of adequate central bank cooperation was when France suffered a speculative 
attack in the following year, 1993.  Again, the French central bank did not raise interest rates 
to keep parity with the DM, concerned at the depressed state of French industry.  But in this 
following  year  Germany’s  central  bank  intervened  on  the  French  Franc’s  behalf.    It 
intervened sufficiently for the depreciation of the French Franc to be modest enough for the 
rules to be doctored and France permitted to stay in the process leading to the euro. 
A more recent example of central bank cooperation is in the set of central bank currency swap 
arrangements  effected  in  September  and  October  2008  in  light  of  the  sub-prime  crisis 
resulting in the collapse of Lehmann Brothers. Currency swaps have been organized between 
the US Federal Reserve Board, not only for numerous developed economies, but also between 
the US Federal Reserve Board with IMF input, to what that board deems developing countries 
with responsible monetary policies.  See the Board’s announcement of 29
th October, which 
contains  also  a  summary  of  its  earlier  reciprocal  currency  deals.    In  the  same  spirit,  the 
European Central Bank has announced swap deals, eg with Denmark, and other central bank 
swaps have occurred, eg that of the Swiss national bank to aid the Polish central bank.  Not all 
central bank cooperation and conflict is publicly announced.  Some instances of cooperation 
and conflict over exchange rate aims are known only to the other official sector, though 
market  participants  attempt  to  guess  and  predict  these  events.    Our  experimental  set-up 
included sessions where the exchange rate aims (and thus cooperation and conflict) are known 
only to the other official sector, and some where the exchange rate aims are public knowledge 
to all.  On why the cooperation was publicly announced in September 2008, see the next 
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readiness or otherwise of the central bank to provide liquidity to commercial banks.  Our set-
up  also  omits  some  instruments  possessed  by  some  central  banks  (and  that  used  to  be 
possessed by most central banks) such as supervision of commercial banks and quantitative 
lending directives.  As regards objectives, our set-up lacks the multiple dimensions of central 
bank  objectives  concerning  banking  fragility  and  market  need  for  liquidity  –  including 
variable definitions of assets acceptable to the central bank.  It collapses all these dimensions 
into  an  invariant  interest  rate  goal.    Nevertheless  our  combined  set  of  instruments  and 
objectives suffices we believe to detect the key objectives and instruments of central banks 
operating in the post Bretton Woods environment. 
Our set-up is decidedly more realistic in these respects than any theoretical model of which 
we are aware.  In such algebraic models it is typical, if the official sector's objectives are 
modelled at all, to limit them to two – 1) some inflation aim, and 2) some output gap aim - 
and limit its instruments to one – typically an interest rate.  Ie in these models, the ratio of 
targets to instruments is 2:1, a little worse than the 7:4 ratio of our set-up.  Further, we are 
extremely  unusual  in  delineating  the  separate  instrument  jurisdictions  of  government  and 
central bank, a matter for which we are indebted to Jürgen von Hagen.  In all these respects 
therefore, we find our set-up unbiased, indeed substantially more realistic than is the norm in 
either theoretical or empirical work.  
In giving the central bank three instruments of setting an interest rate and announcing its price 
and exchange rate target, one reader expressed the conviction that central banks possess only 
one instrument.  We infer the reader was convinced that setting an interest rate was the central 
bank’s sole instrument.  To enable readers to recognise that central banks routinely exercise 
the two other instruments of price and exchange rate targets included in our set-up, we give 
the following examples.  We do so to enable readers to see that the three instruments we give 
our central banks in our set-up are instruments being used in this millennium. 
On  announcing  price  targets,  central  bankers  in  the  US,  the  UK  and  the  euro  made 
announcements earlier in the millennium that inflation was a concern.  By 2009 these same 
central  bankers  were  announcing  the  opposite,  that  inflation  was  not  a  concern.    These 
announcements are not idle chat.  The central banks use them to tell the market, including 
exchange rate dealers, whether these central bankers are contemplating future interest hikes 
that could reduce inflation (in about three years time) and that could raise the exchange rate 
immediately.  These central bank announcements on price targets and the inflation outlook 
affect  commercial  bank  policy  and  exchange  rates.    The  announcements  indicate  to 
commercial bankers whether or not to pass on changes in central bank interest rates to their 
own customers, and are often followed within minutes by a change in that country’s exchange 
rate.  In short these public announcements by central banks of price targets are powerful 
instruments for altering market behaviour.    
Let  us  next  explicate  a  central  bank’s  public  announcements  of  its  exchange  rate  aims.  
Central bankers sometimes express their exchange rate aim in terms of cooperation with other 
central banks to keep exchange rates fairly steady.  One of the landmark events in this regard 
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system with the US secretary of the Treasury Paulson permitting the collapse of the giant 
financial institution Lehmann Brothers with zero measures for an orderly winding up.  The 
consequences  would  have  been  catastrophic  but  for  the  swift  use  of  announced  central 
cooperation.  The US dollar had started rapidly appreciating in the prior quarter due to the 
subprime crisis.  Those who had borrowed in US dollars could no longer rollover their debts 
as planned but had to buy dollars to repay their loans.  This had caused already from July 
2008  a  worldwide  shortage  of  US  dollars  and  appreciation  of  the  US  dollar  before  the 
collapse of Lehmann Brothers, and with the collapse, the US dollar shortage was such that on 
many  measures,  there  had  been  a  collapse  of  the  global  financial  system  that  would  be 
difficult to keep secret for long.  Retrieval from collapse is more likely to be fast with public 
announcements.  One factor aiding retrieval from this collapse was that within a couple of 
days there was a public announcement of Ben Bernanke, the chair of the US Federal Reserve 
Board, that cooperative swaps had been organised for the next 6 months, swaps that were then 
renewed by both parties, and with trial and error, by July 2009 (the time of writing this 
paper),  the  USD  to  euro  exchange  rate  is  about  back  where  it  was  before  this  potential 
exchange rate crisis erupted.  The publicly announced swap procedure facilitated stabilising 
exchange rates by informing traders that central bankers were wary of big exchange rate 
changes and likely to counteract them.   
Central bankers sometimes express their exchange rate in terms of wanting a strong or a weak 
currency for themselves, or about being concerned about their exporters (if the central bank 
wants a depreciation of its currency against the USD) or concerned about those who have to 
repay debts in USD (if the central bank wants an appreciation of its currency). Thus the UK 
government and Mervyn King the Governor of the Bank of England have at times in 2009 
commented favourably on depreciations of the UK pound and unfavourably on any small 
appreciations  of  the  UK  pound  as  damaging  exporters.    Their  public  comments  can  be 
interpreted as informing the market of their intention to have a steady or depreciating pound 
and as engineering further falls in the UK pound simply by virtue of making their public 
announcements.  Their public comments often save the central bank from needing to itself 
intervene in the exchange market in order to get a desired shift in the exchange rate.  The 
financial press frequently reports an exchange rate moving within minutes in the direction 
desired by the central banker who used his exchange rate targets instrument to give a press 
conference.7 
                                                 
7  Central bankers rarely express their exchange rate aim in terms of criticising and threatening another central 
for being uncooperative.  They sometimes however  indirectly publicly criticise that other central bank, eg by 
its not being included in a published list of central banks with whom there are swap announcements.  The 
powerful instruments of publicly criticising and threatening other central banks is mostly left to the other 
branch  of  the  official  sector,  the  government.    A  government  publicly  threatens  trade  wars  against 
uncooperative  foreign  central  banks.    Thus  the  US  and  the  EUC  so  threatened  Japan  in  the  1970s  and 
continued doing so until about 1987, and then so threatened China in the 1990s and continued doing so until 
2008.  In each case the official sector instrument of publicly bad mouthing the other central bank had quite a 
bit of worldly success.  Japan gave in and signed the Louvre Accord of 1987 that involved her in a massive 
and arguably ultra damaging devaluation against the US.   China partially gave in a few years back and 
started appreciating against the US dollar at a gradual pace.  That process of pressing China to depreciate 
essentially stopped in 2008 when the US decided it might be dangerous to let the US dollar collapse and 
started making opposite public announcements about valuing nice cooperative China.   
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communicate within a round.  Their communications are in the form of computer entered text 
messages in the form of wage offers and demands that were public to all, not simply to the 
bargaining pair exchanging them.  These are thus the only players for whom there are series 
of numbers, in the forms of offers and counter offers and associated words, within a round.  
The union representative’s payoff is real wages measured as nominal wages deflated by the 
announced official sector target price, while that of the employer representative, the profit of 
the firms deflated by nominal expenditure.  A strike ensues if after the set time allowed of 10 
minutes, an agreement had not been reached.  Then both negotiators receive zero pay.  In the 
case of a strike: 1) there is an institutionally set minimum wage that is a fixed proportion of 
the target price, and 2) firms are subject to a lower maximum production level and a cut in 
nominal demand relative to that previously announced by the government.   
Once  the  wage  rate  is  announced  for  both  countries,  firms  decide  on  output  and  on  the 
amounts of a currency (home or foreign) to borrow to offer on the foreign exchange market in 
order to either hedge, speculate. The currency market then sets the period’s exchange rate.  
Next the consumer market sets the consumer price, followed by firms paying for last period’s 
imported materials, and each firm’s account balances (from its home and foreign activities) 
flow to the firm’s owners in their home country.   
 
 
4.4  Rounds Interdependent, Sessions Independent Counterfactuals 
A round is the above sequence of decisions and their outcomes played by both the official and 
private sectors.  A round was played 20 times by the same participants, with a lunch break, 
typically after the 8
th round.  A session was a sequence of 20 rounds.  
The rounds of a single session are interdependent, having in each successive round the same 
people  and  some  common  history.    The  first  round  was  preceded  by  over  an  hour’s 
instruction. The participants were economics students at Bonn University who had passed two 
or more years of economics, ranging in skill from those in their third year of undergraduate 
economics up to doctoral candidates.   
There were six sessions run on 6 different days in 2003 with the exchange rate aims of the 
two central banks announced to all.  An additional three sessions were run in 2005, with the 
exchange rate aims known only to the two central banks.  Each of the 9 sessions contained 
different participants, and thus differing propensities to generate shocks, and all our shocks 
were caused by people – as have been nearly all our field shocks.  We have 9 counterfactual 
worlds to aid us in assessing exchange rate regimes.  
By the end of the associated set of experiments, we have almost exhausted our available pool 
of  different  willing  participants.    The  sessions  were  typically  on  Saturdays,  since  few 
participants were available for an entire Monday to Friday weekday.  No session had to be 
abandoned  on  account  of  participants  becoming  bored  or  too  depressed  at  their  earnings 
prospects to continue for the whole day.  To the contrary, especially doctoral students, often Pope et al Prominent Numbers in Exchange Rates: Evidence  31  5 August 2009 
reported  how  interesting  was  the  experience,  and  how  instructive  in  macro-international 
finance.  Many participants asked for permission to repeat but were refused.   
Participants were paid according to their task achievement.  Their earnings varied markedly 
depending on the session and role.  They typically earned between the norm and double the 
hourly  rate  that  students  in  Bonn  obtain  in  outside  casual  employment.    But  there  was 
disparity.  Some earned virtually nothing, and others earned more than fourfold the normal 
student earnings rate. 
 
5  Results 
5.1  The Move of the Exchange Rate Toward 1:1  
In  the  symmetric  incomplete  equilibrium,  the  exchange  rate  conforms  to  the  purchasing 
power parity theory and the interest rates of the two countries offer no arbitrage opportunities 
as they are equal.  The symmetric incomplete equilibrium is only unique in nominal terms.  
Unknown to participants, we start them in round one in such an equilibrium, but not with 
symmetry in nominal terms.  At the start of actual round one, in nominal terms one country 
has its nominal wages and nominal expenditure 1.4 times that of the other country, and thus 
the exchange rate is such that this country pays 1.4 units of its own currency to obtain a unit 
of the other currency.  In this equilibrium, interest parity holds and purchasing parity holds.  If 
this equilibrium were to be maintained, the exchange rate would stay where it begins.   
Starting in equilibrium, if nominalism does not operate, and standard game theory holds, we 
should anticipate no change in the exchange rate throughout the 20 periods.  We should also 
expect no change under two heuristics that choosers might employ in stage 2 of evaluating 
their  alternatives  and  the  likely  future  exchange  rate,  namely  inertia  and  historical 
benchmarking  (since  the  opening  exchange  rate  is  the  only  striking  historical  event).    A 
session with no changes in the exchange rate was not observed however.  In every session the 
exchange rate changed.  
The  actual  exchange  rate  is  determined  in  this  experimental  set-up  by  decisions  of  the 
participants in the manner explained above in section 4.1, in effect the ratio of currency offers 
made by the firms and central banks of each country.  Participants’ choices of prominent 
numbers (by nominal equality or by historical benchmarking or by the mechanisms described 
in section 3.5 above) do not yield a prominent number for the exchange rate since this is the 
ratio of two sums of prominent numbers.  But participants’ choices swayed by such forms of 
nominalism can cause the exchange rate to move in a particular direction.   
As measured by e, the number of unit of home currency needed to buy one unit of foreign 
currency, from the perspective of one country, in the starting equilibrium the exchange rate 
was 1.4.  Thus e, from the perspective of the other country, its partner in trade and capital 
flows, was the inverse of this, namely 0.7143.  The exchange rate has the lower bound of zero 
but no upper bound.  In the Albers prominence theory (Albers 1998a, 1998b and 2001), there 
is a selection rule, but since it rests on their being a finite range of values from which to Pope et al Prominent Numbers in Exchange Rates: Evidence  32  5 August 2009 
select, it is here inapplicable. One cannot select the 3 to 5 most prominent numbers among the 
positive integers. 
For a pair of countries viewing their exchange rates as respectively 1.4 and 0.7143, what then 
becomes prominent when the upper bound does not exist?  One possibility is that inertia or 
historical benchmarking takes centre stage, with the exchange rate being regarded as equally 
likely to go up or down, so that player have a tendency not to alter the initial exchange rate.  
The  other  possibility  is  that  nominal  equality  takes  centre  stage,  with  1:1  becoming  the 
prominent ratio for the exchange rate.   
If the nominal equality of 1:1 did not exert any attraction, and instead the exchange rate 
changes involved random fluctuations, we should anticipate the final exchange rates to be 
equally likely to lie above or below the original exchange rates.  This however was not the 
case.  In each of the nine sessions, the exchange rate had moved in the direction of 1:1 by the 
last period, the 20
th session.  See Table 3, where all exchange rates are expressed from the 
perspective of country B, ie as beginning at 1.4.   
Using the binomial exact test statistic, the probability of this uniform decline being by chance 
– and not due to nominalism – is 0.002, one-tailed, details in the Appendix.  The results thus 
reveal the pronounced influence of the prominent nominal equality ratio of 1:1 on exchange 
rate  determination.    On  superficial  inspection  it  seems  that  players  selected  Albers-style 
prominent numbers for all prices and quantities.  But there are altogether over 6,300 final 
number choices, and many times more in tentative number choices within rounds.   
 
Table 3 
Progression of the Exchange Rate of Country B Toward 1:1   
Exchange Rate Aim  Public Knowledge  Known only in the 
Official Sectors 
Session  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
Start in equilibrium  1.4  1.4  1.4  1.4  1.4  1.4  1.4  1.4  1.4 
20 periods later  1.2  1.14  1.2  1.12  1.19  1.01  1.39  0.96  1 
It will be an interesting future project to investigate whether the Albers Prominent Numbers 
Theory holds for firm choice of production quantities that have specific upper and lower 
bounds.  It will be also an interesting future project to do two things.  First, extend his theory 
with a nominal equality / fairness benchmark with potentially nominalist traits, to the majority 
of these other prices and quantities that lack specific upper and lower bounds.  Second see for 
which roles the extended theory holds. 
Despite the marked trend toward the nominal equality of 1:1, apparently aided by both firm 
and official sector anticipations in this direction, predicting the exchange rate eluded firms.  
They predicted its changes no better than a random walk, Kaiser and Kube (2009).   This 
accords with reality, insofar as we can glean it from the incomplete records of firm failures in 
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A further interesting research project, suggested by a comment of our helpful referee, would 
be to ascertain the extent to which countries that are asymmetric in their real sectors entice 
participants  to  focus  on  a  different  prominent  ratio  of  the  exchange  rate.    Would  it,  for 
instance, be the case that if one country were in real terms double the other, that participants 
would feel that exchange rates should move to render that country's currency worth double 
that of its partner?   
These are interesting questions, but irrelevant to the key claim of this paper.  The key claim of 
this paper is not that any one particular prominent ratio sets all exchange rates in all regions 
over all periods of time.  Indeed our field evidence has demonstrated that many different 
prominent ratios have influenced exchange rates in different regions in different eras of time.  
The key claim of this paper is more abstract.  It is that prominent ratios, numbers and indices 
influence actual exchange rates set.  Indeed the field and laboratory evidence used corroborate 
this key claim demonstrates that in different situations different prominent ratios influence 
and sometimes entirely determine, the actual exchange rate. 
5.2  Effect of Transparency in Central Bank Exchange Rate Aim 
Consider now where along the spectrum from the initial exchange rate of 1.4:1 to the nominal 
equality of 1:1 countries had moved by the 20
th round.  The transparency or otherwise of 
central bank exchange rate aims seems to play a role.  
5.2.1  The Non-Transparent Situation 
In sessions 7, 8 and 9, the central bank exchange rate aims of the two countries are veiled 
from the private sector wage bargainers and firms.  In this veiled condition, the outcomes are 
extreme.  There is virtually no movement toward 1:1, session 7, or full movement to 1:1, 
session  9,  or  even  “overshooting,  session  8.    In  the  additional  complexity  therefore 
participants may be interpreted as focusing their attention on either of two simple exchange 
rate prediction heuristics – inertia, or moving fully to the symmetric 1:1 exchange rate. 
5.2.2  The Transparent Situation 
In sessions 1 to 6, the exchange rate aims of the two central banks are public knowledge.  In 
this transparent and less complex situation, there is less of a polarization.  The move from the 
initial  exchange  rate  of  1.4:1  in  the  direction  of  nominal  equality  with  1:1  is  typically 
intermediate.  Let us divide the distance between 1 and 1.4 into four quarters, and term the 
two middle segments “intermediate”.  Then in five of the six sessions the exchange rate on the 
20
th round lies in the intermediate segment.  The outlier is session 6 which moved virtually the 
full distance to the prominent number 1:1. 
 
5.2.3  Polarisation and Transparency 
We  may  then  hypothesise  that  non-transparent  exchange  rate  aims  generates  more 
polarization.  We can test this against the null hypothesis that the degree of transparency of 
the  exchange  rate  aim  has  no  impact  on  polarization  as  measured  by  the  proportion  of 
exchange rates in the intermediate segment of exchange rates between the initial exchange 
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the range of 1.1 to 1.3.  The null hypothesis is that the non-transparent condition derives from 
a population with no greater a propensity for distribution outside this intermediate segment 
than for the transparent condition.  The probability of the null hypothesis being true is under 
5%,  on  Fisher’s  exact  one-tailed  test,  details  in  the  Appendix.    This  hints  that  either 
nominalism  or  another  rule  of  thumb,  staying  put,  plays  an  even  bigger  role  when  the 
complexity, and thus uncertainty, in the situation rises. 
 
6  Executive Summary and Modelling Implications 
The evaluation of alternatives is stage 2 in the four stages through which decision makers 
progress after encountering a problem within SKAT, the Stages of Knowledge Ahead Theory, 
Pope (1983, 1995) and Pope, Leitner and Leopold (2006, 2009).  It is a stage that EUT, 
axiomatised expected utility theory, excludes, and that prospect theory treats as so simple that 
scientists can discern whether other evaluators do it correctly or make a wrong choice.  In 
exchange rate situations however there is too much complexity for anybody to maximise and 
discern optimal choices.  In evaluating when nobody can optimise, in this paper we have 
concentrated on one nominalistic heuristic to which economic agents might resort, prominent 
number ratios.  In Parts 2 to 5 we presented field and experimental evidence of their role in 
exchange rate determination.  Below we summarise these findings and indicate how they may 
assist  in  future  investigations  of  exchange  rates  –  may  assist  a  little  in  increasing 
understanding  of  exchange  rate  changes,  and  less  certainly,  assist  a  little  in  reducing  the 
unpredictability of exchange rates.  
6.1 Nominalism via Prominence in the Numbers Themselves 
Administered changes in actual exchange rates are limited to prominent numbers, section 
3.5.1 above.  Speculators take an active interest in prominent numbers, section 3.5.2 above.  
Prices and quantities set by participants that enter the actual exchange rate process such as 
central bank administered interest rates are also limited to prominent numbers, section 3.5.3 
above.  Likewise in our laboratory set-up, the numbers chosen by participants for quantities 
and prices that enter the exchange determination were prominent numbers.   
Econometric estimates in other areas have been enhanced from recognizing that variables 
assume values that are discontinuous over the real number line.  Likewise theorizing and 
econometric estimation of exchange rates might benefit from imposing prominent number 
restrictions on administered exchange rates, and on some of the determinants of floating ones.  
It  might  also  benefit  from  investigating  prominent  numbers  as  speculative  attractors  and 
repulsors, and from investigating Albers Prominence Theory for ascertaining what numbers 
are prominent. 
 
6.2  Nominalism via Inertia 
Pope (1981, 1985a, 1987) found in field data in the complex situation of a variable exchange 
rate, the nominalist benchmark of inertia in exchange rate expectations comes into play, as 
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Changes in production were based on the current exchange rate, not on extrapolating past 
exchange rate trends.  In our experimental set-up, for the reasons given in section 5.1, it is 
infeasible to distinguish the inertia effect from either the game theoretic equilibrium exchange 
rate being an attractor, or the attractor being another form of nominalism, namely historical 
benchmarking.  However one of these three effects – likely inertia –operated substantially, in 
that in one session by the final 20
th round, the exchange rate had hardly moved, and that in 
most  other  sessions,  it  had  moved  only  an  intermediate  distance  to  the  attractor  of  the 
prominent nominal equality ratio of 1:1. 
This suggests that there is room for a re-investigation of the common practice of assuming 
that expectations not pertaining to “fundamentals” are based on past trends.  In complex 
environments without marked steady trends, an inertia attractor may be worth investigating 
for exchange rates along with the other attractors identified in this paper and summarized in 
sections 6.3 and 6.4 below.  
 
6.3   Nominalism via Historical Benchmarking 
Mythically and historically prominent exchange rate numbers have had decisive effects on 
actual exchange rates, effects that it was feasible to distinguish from inertia or a notion of the 
“fundamentals” being in equilibrium.  In most of the instances cited in sections 3.3 and 3.4 
above, the mythical or historical benchmark was not simply an influence, but virtually totally 
determined an exchange rate, often for a very extended period.   
Including the idiosyncratic effects of myth and history in exchange rate modelling on any 
extensive scale would be demanding.  Further including such myth and history effects goes 
against the ambition of many economists to model or estimate “economic” not “historical” or 
“metaphysical” causes.  Such economists seek causes that are universal – that will hold “on 
average” in the future and did hold “on average” in the past independently of history and 
evolving  metaphysical  beliefs.    Economics  has  had  over  a  century  of  seeking  to  avoid 
immersion in details and being cataloguers of “accidents of mythology and history”.  We have 
to modify our imperial ambitions as economists of this brand however, and adopt a more 
eclectic methodological approach, if we are to incorporate the sort of field evidence identified 
in this paper. 
When  exchange  rates  were  not  totally  decided  by  history  –  in  the  form  of  historical 
benchmarks – there is more scope for combining “on average” theorizing and econometrics 
with historical effects.  Consider instances when an exchange rate enters a floating regime, or 
declares a cleaner float regime.  At such moments, a historically prominent benchmark comes 
into existence, the prior one.  In theoretical and empirical work embracing such moments, it 
could  be  useful  to  add  gravity  /  attractor  terms  toward  these  historically  prominent 
benchmarks and assess if this improves prediction, retrodiction / understanding. 
 
6.4   Prominent Number Ratios 
The attraction of some exchange rates to prominent number ratios is indicated by the field 
evidence, section 3.5.2.  It is strongly supported by our laboratory experiment in which the Pope et al Prominent Numbers in Exchange Rates: Evidence  36  5 August 2009 
attraction to 1:1 was very highly significant, section 5.1.  There is also evidence from our 
laboratory  experiment  that  polarization  in  the  form  of  an  exchange  rate  either  exhibiting 
inertia, or moving the full distance to another attractor, is accentuated when central bank 
exchange rate aims are non-transparent, section 5.2. 
This happens despite our using a set-up that is far simpler than complex reality and that is 
begun in a symmetric incomplete equilibrium wherein both interest parity and purchasing 
power parity obtain.  The situation is so artificially simple that there are only two currencies 
issued by two countries that are exactly symmetric in every real dimension. Nevertheless the 
participants are unable to understand the cause effect chains sufficiently, resort instead to the 
heuristic of the prominent 1:1 ratio. 
The attraction of exchange rates to prominent number ratios is largely ignored in theoretical 
modelling  of  exchange  rate  determination  over  horizons  longer  than  several  days.    The 
corresponding econometric estimates of quarterly and medium to longer term exchange rates 
typically  impose  no  constraints  on  numbers  chosen,  and  include  no  expectation  terms 
pertaining to prominent number ratios.  It could be useful to include gravity or attractor terms 
toward these.  Likewise, when a new currency is formed, such as the euro, there may have 
been a period when the media focus on whether the exchange rate to the USD was above or 
below 1:1 had an impact, ie acted (perhaps still acts) as an attractor on the actual EUR-USD 
exchange rate.  Again questions could be asked about the series of subsequent attractors for 
the euro noted by chartists as the Euro broke the 1.1.6 “barrier” in April 2009, and on its 
“bounce back” from plummeting to break downward the 1:1.3 “barrier”, and its rise above the 
1:1.4 “barrier” after the central bank currency swaps of September 2008 starting easing the 
liquidity crisis for US dollar debts that cannot be rolled over.  Like questions can be asked for 
most  other  currencies,  since  most  are  perceived  to  have  prominent  number  barriers  by 
chartists.  
 
6.5   Policy Implications 
Nominalism, a focus on prominent numbers, ratios and indices, characterises essentially all 
agents involved in exchange rate determination and also academic economists’ modelling the 
process.  Further academic economists’ models lack out of sample robustness within the short 
to medium time pertinent to firm, household and government policy making.  These findings 
suggest that the retention of multiple currencies in the world can play no equilibrating role to 
enhance economic performance.  Exchange rate stabilisation within a currency union allows 
other desirable goals to be met including freer capital flows, as noted by that father of the 
euro, Padoa-Schioppa (2004).  Exchange rate stabilisation as via a single world currency, 
avoids the transactions costs emphasised by another father of the euro, Mundell (1961 and 
2005).  A single world currency avoids the dangerous beggar-thy-neighbour misapplications 
of Mundell optimal currency model as documented in Pope (2008).  A single world currency 
is  indicated  to  improve  the  macroeconomic  management  of  an  economy,  in  particular 
maintenance of international competitiveness.  This is because official sectors are grappling 
with enough complexity without the extra instrument of being able to alter the exchange rate.  Pope et al Prominent Numbers in Exchange Rates: Evidence  37  5 August 2009 
Having the extra instrument of manipulating the exchange rate cannot speed adjustment to 
“fundamentals” when after 35 years economists have yet to discern them, contributes rather 
to failure to maintain international competitiveness and other macroeconomic goals, Pope, 
Selten, Kube and von Hagen (2008).   
In  short  this  paper  has  found  that  variable  exchange  rates  and  multiple  currencies  leave 
countries subject to the vagaries of prominent numbers, ratios and indices.  In conjunction 
with considerations that a single world currency eliminates associated transactions costs plus 
the multiple uncertainty costs for macroeconomic management and international borrowers 
and lenders, the findings of this paper favour the proposals of Bergsten dating from the 1970s 
and those of China and Russia dating from this millennium to investigate varying the IMF 
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Appendix: The Statistical Tests   
A1  The One-sided Direction of Change in the Exchange Rate 
The null hypothesis is that any deviation of the final 20
th round exchange rate from the inertia attractor 
of the initial exchange rate is random, and hence is equally likely to be in either direction.  The 
alternative hypothesis is that any deviation from inertia is in the downward direction since due to the 
attractor of the nominal equality 1:1 exchange rate.  Hence the test is one-sided. 
We counted how often (0 of 9 times) the final exchange rate was higher than the initial one of 1.4.  On 
a binomial exact test, if the null were correct, this probability is utterly remote, namely 0.001953. 
 
A2  Polarisation in the Exchange Rate 
Divide  the  distance  between  the  two  attractors,  the  initial  exchange  rate  of  1.4  and  the  nominal 
equality exchange rate attractor of 1:1, into four segments.  Then the two middle segments comprise 
exchange rates between 1.1 and 1.3.  Polarisation is measured by the exchange rate by the final 20
th Pope et al Prominent Numbers in Exchange Rates: Evidence  42  5 August 2009 
round lying outside the two middle segments. The null hypothesis is that the extent of polarization in 
the population is independent of transparency concerning central bank exchange rate aims – ie that 
sessions labelled 1-6 and those labelled 7-9 in Table 3 are homogenous a regards polarization.  The 
alternative hypothesis is that nominalism in the form being attracted more strongly to either one of 
these two attractors increases in the more complex situation of a lack of transparency concerning the 
two central banks’ exchange rate aims.  Hence the test is one-sided.  On a Fisher’s exact test, the 
probability  that  the  two  sets  of  sessions  are  homogenous  as  regards  the  extent  of  polarization  is 
0.04761905.  We computed this as follows. 
We constructed the following 2x2 table: 
a  b 
c  d 
    where 
a = the number of observations among the first 6 observations for which 
the final exchange rate lies in [1.1;1.3] = 5 
b = the number of observations among the first 6 observations for which 
the final exchange rate doesn't lie in [1.1;1.3] = 1 
c =  the number of observations among the last 3 observations for which 
the final exchange rate lies in [1.1;1.3] = 0 
d =  the number of observations among the last 3 observations for which 
the final exchange rate doesn't lie in [1.1;1.3] = 3 
Then we calculated the significance level as: 
p = [ (a+b)!(c+d)!(a+c)!(b+d)! ] / [ a!b!c!d!n! ] 
= [ (5+1)! (3+0)! (5+0) ! (1+3)! ] /  [ 5!1!0!3!9! ] 
= (6!3!5!4!) / (5!1!0!3!9!) 
= (6!4!) / 9! 
=  24 /504 
= 0.04761905. 